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The concept of t h e  program o f f i c e  as a sepa ra t e  and via- 
b l e  o rgan iza t iona l  e n t i t y  is  r e l a t i v e l y  r ecen t  t o  both t h e  
government and i n d u s t r i a l  management scene. The l i t e r a t u r e  
on program management has  gene ra l ly  d e a l t  wi th  such t h i n g s  as 
t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  program manager and t h e  a c t u a l  build-up and 
organiza t ion  of t h e  o f f i c e  i t s e l f .  R e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  has been 
w r i t t e n  about what happens t o  a program o f f i c e  once t h e  pro- 
gram i s  completed. Where do t h e  people go? What i s  t h e  im-  
pac t  on t h e  t o t a l  o rganiza t ion?  
This  r epor t  analyzes  and d i scusses  problems t h e  NASA 
Manned Spacecraf t  Center experienced when faced wi th  t h e  com- 
p l e t i o n  of both t h e  Mercury and t h e  Gemini Program. The re- 
p o r t  descr ibes  t h e  processes  used i n  phasing down t h e  Mercury 
and Gemini Program Off ices .  I n  t h e  phasedown of  t h e  l a t t e r  
o f f i c e ,  a ques t ionnai re  was  p repared  and adminis tered t o  t h e  
e f f ec t ed  employees. The r e s u l t s  of t h i s  and o t h e r  analyses  
are summarized and a set  of conclusions and recommendations 
drawn from them. 
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FOREWORD 
This s tudy w a s  undertaken as p a r t  of t h e  Resident 
Research Fellowship Program co-sponsored by t h e  Manned 
Spacecraf t  Center and t h e  Un ive r s i ty  of Minnesota 's  
Pub l i c  Adminis t ra t ion Center. The f i n i s h e d  r e p o r t  has  
been submit ted t o  t h e  Un ive r s i ty  of Minnesota as a the-  
sis which w i l l  p a r t i a l l y  f u l f i l l  t h e  requirements f o r  
t h e  degree o f  Master of A r t s  i n  Pub l i c  Adminis t ra t ion.  
The Resident Research Fellowship Program i s  designed t o  
provide u n i v e r s i t y  graduate  s tuden t s  w i th  t h e  opportun- 
i t y  of broadening t h e i r  experience and conducting re -  














INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
THE MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER'S ORGANIZATIONAL 
STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
THE PHASE OUT OF THE MERCURY PROJECT OFFICE . 
THE PHASE OUT OF THE GEMINI PROGRAM OFFICE . . 
THE PHASE OUT OF THE GEMINI PROGRAM OFFICE AS 
VIEWED BY MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS . . . 
EMPLOYEE REACTIONS TO THE PHASE OUT . 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. .  
. .  
. .  
. .  
. .  














L I S T  OF TABLES 
Table ?age 
I. WORKLOAD CONSIDERATIONS I N  PHASEDOWN PLANNIfJG . . . . . . 21 
11. CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL BEING CONSIDERED . . . . . . . . 22 
111. MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL FROM THE GEMINI  PROGRAM O F F I C E  
BY RECEIVING ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 29 
v i  
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1 Manned Spacecraf t  Center organiza t ion  Chart , 
December 23, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
2 Gemini Program Off ice  Organizat ion Char t ,  
June 7 , 1 9 6 5  . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
3 Manpower worked on Gemini P r o j e c t s  by Quar te r ,  
September 30, 1963 through February 28, 1967 . . . . 18 
4 Di s t r ibu t ion  of Technical P ro fes s iona l s  i n  t h e  
Gemini Program Off ice  by Grade, June 30, 1966 . . . . 27 
5 Office of  Manned Space F l i g h t ,  NASA Headquarters , 
Organization Chart ,  February 1, 1967 . . . . . . . . 30 
CHAPTER I 
One of  t h e  f a c t o r s  which has an important e f f e c t  on t h e  s t a b i l i t y  of 
any employment i s  t h e  degree of f l u c t u a t i o n  i n  t he  a c t i v i t y  wi th  which t h e  
o rgan iza t ion  i s  concerned. While employment i n  t h e  pub l i c  s e r v i c e  i s  ca- 
pable  of  a g r e a t e r  s t ab i l i t y  than i s  f r equen t ly  t r u e  i n  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y ,  
government as w e l l  must a t  t imes f a c e  t h e  problem of  c u t t i n g  i t s  p a y r o l l s  
o r  reorganiz ing  t o  meet new s i t u a t i o n s  as they  arise.  I n  t h e  Federa l  C i -  
v i l  Serv ice  t h e  former i s  known as a reduct ion  i n  force .  Changes i n  pro- 
grams and o rgan iza t ion  may, however, lead t o  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t r a n s f e r s  
and reassignments as w e l l  as reduct ions  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  agencies ,  The an- 
nua l  review of budgets  and appropr ia t ions  can and often does c r e a t e  an 
atmosphere charged wi th  unce r t a in ty .  
An organiza t ion  s t r u c t u r e d  on t h e  basis of i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  programs 
o f t e n  f aces  an extremely complex problem i n  dea l ing  wi th  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
of i t s  personnel ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  when those  programs are s u b j e c t  t o  contin- 
u a l  change. This  i s  e spec ia l ly  t r u e  i n  r e sea rch  and development organi-  
z a t i o n s ,  whether pub l i c  or p r i v a t e ,  where t h e  completion o f  one program 
over laps  o r  i s  t o  be followed by t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  of a new one. T h i s  t ype  
of s i t u a t i o n  i s  one which the  Nat ional  Aeronautics and Space Administra- 
t i o n ' s  Manned Spacecraf t  Center,  Houston, Texas, has  had t o  f a c e  s e v e r a l  
times i n  t h e  p a s t  and w i l l  su re ly  experience i n  t h e  f u t u r e  as w e l l .  
The Manned Spacecraf t  Center has as i t s  primary mission t h e  develop- 
ment of  spacecraf t  f o r  manned space f l i g h t  programs and t h e  conduct of  
manned f l i g h t  opera t ions .  
given t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  four  major space r e sea rch  and exp lo ra t ion  
programs: t h e  Mercury, Gemini, Apollo,  and Apollo Appl ica t ions  programs. 
Since i t s  establ ishment  i n  1961, it has been 
The Cen te r ' s  mission f u r t h e r  embraces an engineer ing ,  development 
and opera t ions  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  support  t h e s e  p r o j e c t s  and t o  genera te  t h e  
knowledge r equ i r ed  t o  advance t h e  technology of space and manned space- 
c r a f t  development, Engineering and development e f f o r t s  have focused on 
t h e  conception and implementation of a program of  app l i ed  r e sea rch  and 
development i n  t h e  areas of space r e sea rch ,  space phys ics ,  l i f e  systems,  
and t e s t  and eva lua t ion .  1 
I n  view of t h e  na tu re  of t h e  mission of  t h i s  government agency, it 
can r e a d i l y  be seen t h a t  w e  a r e  dea l ing  w i t h  not  only a cons t an t ly  chang- 
ing  o rgan iza t ion ,  bu t  one i n  which change i s  o f t e n ,  of n e c e s s i t y ,  very 
'SQFerior numbers r e f e r  t o  s i m i l a r l y  numbered re ferences  at the  end 
of  t h i s  paper.  
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r ap id .  
d i scuss ions  of an organiza t ion  of t h i s  type .  
one p r o j e c t  t o  another  personnel  s h i f t s  w i l l  fo l low,  but  how can t h e s e  
t r a n s f e r s  be arranged without a cons tan t  d i s r u p t i o n  of t h e  employee him- 
s e l f ,  and of  t h e  o rgan iza t ion ,  and an inc rease  of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  and a 
lowering of both e f f i c i e n c y  and morale? What, i f  any, procedures could 
be developed t o  make t h i s  process  as e f f i c i e n t  as p o s s i b l e  wi th  t h e  least 
d i s rup t ion  t o  a f f e c t e d  employees and t h e  program i n  progress?  
This  br ings i n t o  focus a ques t ion  t h a t  i s  very o f t e n  neglec ted  i n  
A s  emphasis i s  s h i f t e d  from 
These a r e  some of t h e  ques t ions  which t h i s  paper  w i l l  at tempt t o  an- 
To accomplish t h i s  purpose,  t h e  paper has been d iv ided  i n t o  sev- swer. 
eral  p a r t s .  
s t r u c t u r e  w i t h  s p e c i f i c  re ference  t o  what has come t o  be c a l l e d  "program 
management". A b r i e f  desc r ip t ion  of t h e  o rgan iza t iona l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  
Nat ional  Aeronautics and Space Adminis t ra t ion ' s  Manned Spacecraf t  Center 
w i l l  comprise Chapter 111. 
Chapter I1 w i l l  d e a l  wi th  t h e  ques t ion  o f  o rgan iza t iona l  
From t h e r e  we w i l l  proceed t o  t h a t  po r t ion  of t h e  paper  which dea l s  
wi th  t h e  s p e c i f i c  experiences of t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center wi th  t h e  
problem of  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of personnel  at  t h e  te rmina t ion  of a program. 
Chapter I V  i s  a d i scuss ion  of t h e  phase-out of t h e  Mercury P ro jec t  Of f i ce  
i n  1963, t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center ' s  f i r s t  experience wi th  t h e  termi- 
na t ion  of a program. 
A g r e a t e r  problem w a s  faced r e c e n t l y  when t h e  Gemini Program Off ice  
wes phased out and almost 200 people had t o  be reass igned  t o  new p o s i t i o n s  
wi th in  t h e  organiza t ion .  
t h i s  paper i s  devoted. 
d e t a i l e d  repor t  of t h e  procedures which were used t o  accomplish t h i s  phase 
out  while  Chapters V I  and V I 1  conta in  an a n a l y s i s  of t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  
procedures as viewed by both management and t h e  a f f e c t e d  employees. The 
necessary information was acquired through numerous in te rv iews  wi th  man- 
agement o f f i c i a l s  and t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of 167 ques t ionna i r e s  t o  t h e  em- 
ployees involved. 
It is t o  t h i s  problem t h a t  t h e  major p o r t i o n  of 
Included i n  t h e  d iscuss ion  i n  Chapter V w i l l  be a 
From t h e  information s o  obta ined  conclusions w i l l  be reached as t o  
t h e  e f f ec t iveness  of t h e  p o l i c i e s  and procedures t h a t  were chosen and 
suggest ions made regarding any improvements or a l t e r n a t i v e s  t h a t  could 
have or should have been used. Once t h i s  has been determined, it 
w i l l  be poss ib l e  t o  develop gu ide l ines  i n  Chapter V I 1 1  t h a t  perhaps w i l l  
be of  some as s i s t ance  t o  those  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  phasing out  of pro- 
grams i n  t h e  fu tu re .  
CHAPTER ii 
There i s  no ques t ion  t h a t  t h e  concept and i n s t i t u t i o n  of  program 
management has played an inc reas ing ly  important role both  i n  t echn ica l ly -  
based i n d u s t r i e s  o r i e n t e d  toward government work and i n  t h e  Federa l  Gov- 
ernment i t s e l f .  One reason f o r  t h i s  t r e n d  i s  t h e  change i n  t h e o r i e s  and 
phi losophies  of management. The Space Age has produced performance capa- 
b i l i t i e s  r e q u i r i n g  completely new doc t r ines  of con t ro l .  The establ ishment  
of  t h e  program o f f i c e  concept i s  t h e  r e su l t  of t h e  need t o  concent ra te  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for development and product ion e f f o r t s  i n  one organiza t ion .  
The s p e c i f i c  t i t l e  of program/project management i s  r e l a t i v e l y  new, 
a l though d i f f e r e n t  t i t l e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  have been used i n  t h e  p a s t  
t o  descr ibe  t h e  func t ion  which it des igna tes .  According t o  Baumgartner, 
during World War I1 t h e  government used a type  of "p ro jec t  manager" t o  ex- 
p e d i t e  t h e  d e l i v e r y  of w a r  goods. Program management i n  t h e  atomic bomb 
p r o j e c t  r ep resen t s  t h e  f i r s t  app l i ca t ion  of t h e  concept as it i s  thought  
of today. It w a s  not  u n t i l  t h e  miss i le  programs of t h e  m i d - 1 9 5 0 ' ~ ~  how- 
eve r ,  t h a t  t h e  concept of  program management came i n t o  g e n e r a l  acceptance 
i n  t h e  defense-or iented indus t ry .  The a c t u a l  t e r m  "p ro jec t  management" 
w a s  o r i g i n a t e d  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y - i n d u s t r i a l  complex. It has made p o s s i b l e  
t h e  management of l a r g e  aggregat ions of resources  across  f u n c t i o n a l  and 
o rgan iza t iona l  l i n e s  d i r e c t e d t o w a r d  uni fy ing  a l l  e f f o r t  t o  t h e  common 
ob jec t ive .  * While program management w a s  conceived i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
and func t iona l  approach t o  management, it has a l s o  provided a unique way 
of planning f o r  t h e  development of  t h e  h ighly  t e c h n i c a l  and c o s t l y  space 
programs. Procurement f o r  such  a program involves  many l a r g e  and rela- 
t i v e l y  autonomous organiza t ions  i n  both  government and indus t ry .  The 
a u t h o r i t y  of t h e  program manager permi ts  him t o  manage ac ross  f u n c t i o n a l  
and o rgan iza t iona l  l i n e s  i n  order  t o  b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  a t  one po in t  t h e  ac- 
t i v i t i e s  r equ i r ed  t o  develop and produce a space veh ic l e .  
Looking b r i e f l y  a t  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  framework of management, one f i n d s  
t h a t  what t h e  manager does i s  a c t u a l l y  fundamental and u n i v e r s a l  i n  i t s  
a p p l i c a t i o n  r ega rd le s s  o f  t h e  type  of  o rgan iza t ion  involved. Regardless 
of t h e i r  l e v e l  i n  an organiza t ion ,  a l l  managers w i l l  perform c e r t a i n  b a s i c  
func t ions  d i r e c t e d  toward t h e  accomplishment of predetermined goa l s  or end 
products .  Management as an art r e q u i r e s  s k i l l  i n  performance acqui red  
through experience.  A s  a sc ience ,  management has been s t rengthened  by 
knowledge which has  been systematized and formulated by t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  
of  gene ra l  hypotheses and p r i n c i p l e s .  
knowledge and s k i l l s  apa r t  f rom t e c h n i c a l  s k i l l s  such as engineer ing ,  ac- 
count ing,  product ion ,  procurement and t h e  many o t h e r  s k i l l s  found i n  corn- 
p l e x  organiza t ions .  
Management i s  a d i s t i n c t  f i e l d  of 
4 
The program manager i s  respons ib le  f o r  bo th  making and execut ing de- 
c i s i o n s  i n  an environment of high r i s k  and unce r t a in ty  under a management 
philosophy where conventional o rgan iza t iona l  theory  and p r a c t i c e  a r e  in-  
adequate.  I n  accomplishing h i s  t a s k ,  he e x h i b i t s  s e v e r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
which d i f f e r  from t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  manager.3 I n  t h e  first p l ace ,  t h e  pro- 
gram manager is concerned wi th  s p e c i f i c ,  f i n i t e  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  are o f t e n  
p r imar i ly  accomplished by organiza t ions  and i n d i v i d u a l s  not under h i s  
personal  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  This concept of a u t h o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  does 
not necessa r i ly  follow t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s c a l a r  cha in  of  h ie rarchy  , bu t  
r a t h e r  flows as a "web of r e l a t ionsh ips"  or " i n t e r f a c e s "  which pervade 
t h e  organiza t iona l  s t r u c t u r e s  involved. 
Secondly, because t h e  a u t h o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  p a t t e r n s  repre-  
s en t  i n t e r f a c e s  r a t h e r  than  a d i s t i n c t  h i e r a r c h i c a l  f low, t h e r e  i s  an 
inherent  c o n f l i c t  between t h e  program manager and t h e  func t iona l  managers. 
Funct ional  managers f i n d  themselves shar ing  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  wi th  t h e  pro- 
gram manager. 
au tho r i ty" ,  a concept of a u t h o r i t y  which depa r t s  r a d i c a l l y  from t h e  l i n e -  
s t a f f  o rganiza t iona l  dichotomy t h a t  has been t h e  basis of func t iona l  man- 
agement theory.  This program a u t h o r i t y  provides  t h e  formal basis f o r  t h e  
management t i e s  which bind toge the r  t h e  var ious  o rgan iza t iona l  elements.  
The r e s u l t  i s  t h e  emergence of  what i s  knows as "program 
Thi rd ly ,  t h e  program manager manages a l a r g e  number of p ro fes s iona l s .  
A s  a r e s u l t ,  he f inds  it necessary t o  use d i f f e r e n t  management techniques 
be a modif icat ion of  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  func t ions  of management through t h e  
use of motivat ion,  persuas ion ,  and personal  c o n t r o l  techniques.  For many 
p ro fes s iona l s ,  management must inc lude  d iscuss ions  of  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  of any 
p a r t i c u l a r  e f f o r t  i n  add i t ion  t o  t h e  more obvious func t ions  of p lanning ,  
organiz ing ,  d i r e c t i n g ,  and con t ro l l i ng .  
, from those  used i n  a simple superior-subordinate  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  There must 
Fourthly,  t h e  program manager i s  a po in t  of syn thes i s  f o r  t h e  program 
i n  d i r e c t i n g  o rgan iza t iona l  elements ou t s ide  h i s  immediate con t ro l .  Ne 
b r ings  toge the r  such d ive r se  func t iona l  a c t i v i t i e s  as engineer ing,  t e s t i n g ,  
p roduct ion ,  ope ra t iona l  support  , e t c .  , a l l  of which must be time-phased 
over t h e  l i f e  of  t h e  program r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  mission.  
Fu r the r ,  t h e  program manager provides  a unif 'ying fo rce  t o  a program. 
(1) t h e  program ac- Without such a Force, two a l t e r n a t i v e s  a r e  poss ib l e :  
t i v i t i e s  would remain f u n c t i o n a l l y  sepa ra t ed  wi th  t h e  risk of  a l a c k  of 
unanimity of o b j e c t i v e ;  or ( 2 )  t h e  sen io r  execut ive of t h e  producing or- 
gan iza t ion  could perform program i n t e g r a t i o n .  Nei ther  choice i s  accept- 
ab le  s i n c e ,  by na tu re ,  func t iona l  managers a r e  pa roch ia l  (as would be ex- 
pec ted)  and sen io r  execut ives  a r e  more concerned wi th  ove r -a l l  support  of 
a l l  programs and long-range planning for t h e i r  o rganiza t ion  than  wi th  uni- 
fy ing  a s p e c i f i c  program. 
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I n  t h e  area of personnel ,  t h e  examination of which i s  t h e  primary 
purpose of t h i s  paper ,  it is a l so  apparent  t h a t  a program manager must 
be capable  of  i n s p i r i n g  t h e  employees of  a program o f f i c e  t o  g ive  t h e i r  
best e f f o r t s  f o r  h i s  p r o j e c t .  From t h e  v e r y  beginning,  however, he  has 
a very s t rong  f a c t o r  working f o r  t h e  success  of t h e  program, and t h i s  
i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  it i s  a program. The purpose of t h e  program and t h e  
c l a r i t y  wi th  which program personnel  uaderstand it are t h e  main reasons 
why an e s p r i t  de corps i s  inva r i ab ly  ev ident  on programs and may be lack-  
ing  i n  func t iona l  and o the r  working areas not normally engaged i n  work 
wi th  f i n i t e  o b j e c t i v e s  and measures of accomplishment. 
v e h i c l e  i s  launched, everyone who worked on t h e  p r o j e c t  feels  t h a t  it i s  
h i s  veh ic l e  ou t  t h e r e ;  ... The f a c t  t h a t  a program has obviously meas- 
u rab le  performance, schedule ,  and cos t  o b j e c t i v e s ,  and se rves  an impor- 
t a n t  and i d e n t i f i a b l e  purpose a r e  t h e  two b a s i c  ing red ien t s  which a i d  i n  
developing personnel  i n t o  a team. 
"When a space 
1 1 4  
The p e r i o d i c  s h i f t i n g  inherent  i n  t h e  program o f f i c e  o rgan iza t iona l  
approach can, however, a f f e c t  t h e  personnel  of t h e  program o f f i c e  i n  a 
variety of ways, both  d e s i r a b l e  and undes i rab le .  I n  some cases  it i s  an 
a i d  t o  avoiding a s t a t i c  job  s i t u a t i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, when t h e  
average program o f f i c e  has a shor t  l i f e  ( t h r e e  yea r s  o r  l e s s )  t h e  employee 
may have t o  be t o o  o f t e n  uprooted and t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  f e e l  any sense of  
s e c u r i t y .  Moreover, t h e  mix of d i c i p l i n e s  found i n  a program o f f i c e  may 
l i m i t  t h e  oppor tuni ty  of  t h e  program manager t o  rear range  assignments t o  
equa l i ze  workloads o r  a c c e l e r a t e  h i s  program, and t o  add t o  h i s  s t a f f  he 
must arrange f o r  t r a n s f e r s  from o t h e r  elements w i t h i n  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  or 
r e c r u i t  a d d i t i o n a l  people  from ou t s ide  t h e  organiza t ion .  
Another problem which has g e n e r a l l y  been l e f t  unanswered i s  t h e  ques- 
t i o n  of what happens t o  t h e  program o f f i c e  personnel  when t h e  p r o j e c t  i n  
which they  have been engaged is  completed. I n  t h e  case  where it has been 
a s h o r t  t e r m  p r o j e c t  and t h e  employees were drawn from t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  or- 
gan iza t ions  t o  work on i t ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  simple: 
t e rmina t ion  of  t h e  p r o j e c t  t hese  employees w i l l  normally r e t u r n  t o  t h e i r  
o r i g i n a l  and permanent p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  l i n e  o rgan iza t ions .  
at t h e  
But what about t h e  program which takes s e v e r a l  yea r s  t o  complete? 
Many of t h e  employees were h i r ed  d i r e c t l y  i n t o  t h e  program o f f i c e  and have 
no o t h e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  whlch t o  r e t u r n .  
za t ions  i s  on-going and they  have presumably been f u l l y  s t a f f e d  during 
t h i s  per iod .  
The work i n  t h e  func t iona l  organi-  
The na tu re  of program o f f i c e  o rgan iza t ion  i s  such t h a t  i t s  s i z e  i n  
terms of personnel  i s  gene ra l ly  small r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  t o t a l  o rganiza t ion .  
Even then ,  however, if t h e  organiza t ion  i s  f u l l y  s t a f f e d  it may prove d i f -  
f i c u l t  t o  absorb even a small number of  employees r e l e a s e d  from t h e  pro- 
gram o f f i c e .  This  can be  a s i g n i f i c a n t  problem i n  a government agency 
c 
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where ceilings are placed on the number of employees allowable at any 
one point in time. In the event that there are new programs developing 
or programs in progress at the time one office is phasing out, the prob- 
lem is much less severe. At that time there is a great demand for the 
skills and experience of the employees being released. 
These are only a few of the problems which must be faced in a pro- 
gram oriented organization. 
sing some of the actual problems with which the Manned Spacecraft Center 
dealt with when two of its program offices were phased out. Before pro- 
ceeding further, however, it will be appropriate to include a brief de- 
scription of this agency's organizational structure in order to provide 
us with the proper frame of reference. 
In the following chapters we will be discus- 
CHAPTER I11 
THE MAN1iED SPACECPOT CENTER' S ORGX'?IZATIONAL STR'U'CTC'RE 
The preceding d i scuss ion  of t h e  na tu re  of and o rgan iza t ion  f o r  pro- 
gram management i s  q u i t e  r e l evan t  t o  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  at t h e  Manned Space- 
c r a f t  Center. Due t o  t h e  na ture  of  t h e  s e v e r a l  missions f o r  which t h i s  
agency has r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  w e  f i n d  t h e  program o f f i c e  concept superimpos- 
ed over t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  o rgan iza t iona l  s t r u c t u r e .  (See f i g .  1.) 
During t h e  Gemini program, MSC w a s  b a s i c a l l y  composed of several 
func t iona l  d i r e c t o r a t e s  and two program o f f i c e s .  The Engineering and 
Development Di rec to ra t e  i s  respons ib le  for t h e  t e c h n i c a l  support  i n  
depth f o r  t h e  manned space f l i g h t  programs. 
t o ra t e  i s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  ope ra t iona l  mission planning and f o r  t h e  over- 
a l l  d i r e c t i o n  and management of f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  and recovery a c t i v i t i e s  
a s soc ia t ed  wi th  rea l - t ime mission progress  assessment,  and ground-based 
decision-making func t ions  f o r  a l l  Manned Spacecraf t  Center space f l i g h t  
missions.  The F l i g h t  Crew Operations D i r e c t o r a t e  has  t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  t h e  o v e r a l l  program of f l i g h t  crew s e l e c t i o n ,  t r a i n i n g ,  and mission 
performance. The Medical Research and Operations D i r e c t o r a t e  i s  respon- 
s i b l e  f o r  biomedical research  e f f o r t  i n  manned f l i g h t s .  The Administra- 
t i o n  D i r e c t o r a t e  has t h e  r e s p o n s i b l i t y  f o r  money, materials, and manpower. 
It prepares  , consol ida tes  , and analyzes  t h e  budgets , f i n a n c i a l  ope ra t ing  
p l ans ,  cos t  estimates, and f i s c a l  s e r v i c e s  f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  Center.  
add i t ion ,  it provides  t h e  admin i s t r a t ive  and t e c h n i c a l  s e r v i c e s  support  
requi red  by a l l  Center opera t ing  elements.  The Science and Appl ica t ions  
Di rec to ra t e  i s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  planning and implementation o f  Manned 
Spacecraf t  Center  programs i n  t h e  a reas  of space sc i ence  and i t s  appl ica-  
t i o n s ,  f o r  a c t i n g  as a f o c a l  po in t  f o r  a l l  manned Spacecraf t  Center ele- 
ments involved i n  t h e s e  programs, and f o r  a c t i n g  as t h e  Cen te r ' s  p o i n t  
of  contac t  w i th  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  community. 
The F l i g h t  Operations Direc- 
I n  
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The r e s u l t s  of much of the  work i n  t h e  Engineering and Development 
Di rec to ra t e ,  t h e  F l i g h t  Operations D i r e c t o r a t e ,  and t h e  F l i g h t  C r e w  Op- 
e r a t i o n s  D i r e c t o r a t e  are channeled i n t o  t h e  program o f f i c e s .  These re- 
s u l t s  a r e  eva lua ted  i n  terms of t h e  s p e c i f i c  requirements f o r  each pro- 
gram and are then  incorpora ted  i n t o  t h e  design and ope ra t ion  of t h e  
spacec ra f t  . 
During t h e  pe r iod  of t h e  Gemini Program t h e  Gemini Program Off i ce  
provided t h e  o v e r a l l  management o f  a l l  Gemini program e f f o r t s  and a l l  
















implementation of t h e  program. By coord ina t ing  wi th  o t h e r  Manned Space- 
c r a r t  Center eiemeriis , G L L L C L  : v e b 1 u u a l  ullaUULCo uIIu vrw-u ..-..__-_U _ _  - 
t i o n  Centers , o the r  agencies , and con t r ac to r s  , and by d i r e c t i n g  support-  
i n g  agencies  and/or  c o n t r a c t o r s ,  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  Gemini Program 
encompassed t h e  development , t e s t ,  and opera t ion  of  a l l  spacec ra f t  , tar- 
g e t  v e h i c l e s ,  launch v e h i c l e s ,  and a s s o c i a t e d  ground equipment and f a c i l -  
i t i e s  wi th in  t h e  Gemini Program Office. '  
which w a s  o f f i c i a l l y  removed from t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  o rgan iza t ion  
c h a r t  as of February 16 ,  1967, w i l l  be d iscussed  i n  f u r t h e r  d e t a i l  at 
a l a t e r  p o i n t .  
1 7  .-.. -7.~1 ----i A +:-- - - A  cnonn fi&,,inic+rc- 
The func t ions  of t h i s  o f f i c e ,  
The Apollo Spacecraf t  Program Of f i ce  i s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  success- 
f u l  execut ion of t h e  manned lunar  landing  program, and implements t h i s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  by providing o v e r a l l  p lanning ,  coord ina t ion ,  and d i r e c t i o n  
of  a l l  a spec t s  of t h e  program through t h e  superv is ion  of i n d u s t r i a l  con- 
t r a c t o r s  and through t h e  d i r e c t i o n  and coord ina t ion  of o t h e r  elements 
of t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center and t h e  Nat ional  Aeronautics and Space 
Adminis t ra t ion which are assigned p a r t s  of t h e  p r o j e c t .  7 
While t h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  o rgan iza t iona l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  Manned 
Spacecraf t  Center i s  admit tedly b r i e f ,  it i s  meant only t o  provide a 
frame of r e fe rence  f o r  understanding t h e  phase-out experiences descr ibed  
i n  t h e  fol lowing chapters .  
I -  -  
THE PHASE OUT OF THE MERCURY PROJECT OFFICE 
A s  s t a t e d  a t  t h e  t ime of t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  of P r o j e c t  Mercury, t h e  ob- 
j e c t i v e s  of  t h e  program were t o  p l ace  a manned spacec ra f t  i n  o r b i t a l  
f l i g h t  around t h e  e a r t h ;  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  man’s performance c a p a b i l i t i e s  
and h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  func t ion  i n  t h e  environment of  space;  and t o  recover  
t h e  man and t h e  spacec ra f t  s a f e l y .  After e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e s e  ob jec t ives  
f o r  t h e  p r o j e c t ,  a number of  gu ide l ines  were set  f o r t h  t o  in su re  t h a t  
t h e  most expedient and s a f e s t  approach f o r  a t ta inment  of t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  
were followed. Included among t h e s e  gu ide l ines  were t h a t  e x i s t i n g  tech-  
nology and available equipment should be used whenever p r a c t i c a l ;  t h e  
s imples t  and most r e l i a b l e  approach t o  systems design would be fol lowed;  
an e x i s t i n g  launch veh ic l e  would be employed t o  p l ace  t h e  spacec ra f t  i n t o  
8 o r b i t ;  and a p rogres s ive  and l o g i c a l  t e s t  program would be conducted. 
*The  Mercury P r o j e c t  O f f i c e  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  t o  t a k e  charge of conduct- 
i ng  and coord ina t ing  t h i s  vast p r o j e c t .  
t h e r e  were some 650 people ( inc luding  t h e  P ro jec t  O f f i c e )  working d i r e c t l y  
on P ro jec t  Mercury i n  t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center ,  and over 700 more i n  
o t h e r  Nat ional  Aeronautics and  Space Adminis t ra t ion o rgan iza t ions .  
A t  t h e  he ight  of  t h e  program 
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I n  May 1963, t h e  n i n t h  Mercury mission w a s  flown. Although it w a s  
a l r eady  planned t h a t  t h i s  p r o j e c t  would be phased out  at t h e  completion 
of t h i s  mission,  it w a s  s t rong ly  hoped by many wi th in  t h e  agency t h a t  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  two f l i g h t s  would be forthcoming. It w a s  f e l t  t h a t  more ex- 
per ience  with longer  du ra t ion  f l i g h t s  t o  f u r t h e r  t h e  s tudy  of t h e  e f f e c t s  
of space on man would be des i r ab le .  Consequently, t h e  Mercury P r o j e c t  
team was he ld  t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e  event  t h e s e  two a d d i t i o n a l  f l i g h t s  rece ived  
approval.  
However, i n  June 1963, t he  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t h e s e  two f l i g h t s  w a s  e l i m -  
i n a t e d  when t h e  end of P ro jec t  Mercury w a s  announced by Adminis t ra tor  
James Webb a t  Nat ional  Aeronautics and Space Adminis t ra t ion Headquarters.  
The Mercury team and i t s  f ac i l i t i e s  were t o  be u t i l i z e d  i n  t h e  Gemini and 
Apollo Programs. 
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Because t h e  Mercury team had been he ld  toge the r  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of  
f u r t h e r  f l i g h t s ,  when t h e  end of t h e  p r o j e c t  w a s  announced l i t t l e  i n  t h e  
way of p repa ra t ions  f o r  t h e  reassignment of t h e s e  P r o j e c t  Off ice  employees 
had been made.” A t  t h a t  t ime t h e r e  were 50 people  i n  t h e  Mercury P r o j e c t  
Of f i ce ,  inc luding  about 30 pro fes s iona l  people ,  f o r  whom reassignments had 
12 
to be quickly arranged. 
to alleviate a number of potentially difficult problems in the reassign- 
ment of these personnel. Due to the continuing growth of the Manned 
Spacecraft Center at that time and to the increasing emphasis and enlarg- 
ing scope of the already approved Gemini and Apollo Programs, positions 
within the organizational elements were readily available. As the Center 
was growing rapidly in personnel it was clear that there would be no need 
for a reduction in force, and what resulted was only the necessity for 
developing specific procedures that would facilitate the rapid placement 
of the personnel being released. 
The time of the completion of the program helped 
Because this was the first time since the establishment of the Cen- 
ter that a program office was to be phased out, there was little in the 
way of past experience on which to base these procedures. 
be no reduction in force and it was decided initially that all transfers 
were to be made with no change in the grade of any employee, potential 
difficulties with the merit system regulations were avoided. There were 
285 vacancies in the organization in June 1963, and two other program 
offices were already functioning both of which needed these highly train- 
ed employees as the Center had been doubling in size each year and experi- 
enced people in spacecraft management were not readily available. Because 
the Project Office employees represented a great asset to the Center, the 
basic question was not whether these people would have positions but 
rather how their special skills could best be utilized. 
As there would 
In view of these facts, the procedures which were developed were 
relatively uncomplicated. A listing of the available personnel was pre- 
pared by the Mercury Project Office Manager and was sent directly to the 
Division Chiefs of the other organizational elements. It was felt that 
there was no need for the inclusion of resumes on these individuals be- 
cause the small size of the organization meant there was a greater famil- 
iarity with each individual employee. With the distribution of this list 
the Mercury Office requested from each element a list stating any prefer- 
ence it may have had for specific employees. However, only the Gemini 
Office submitted such a preference list. The Project Manager then pre- 
pared "availability sheets" on which was included information concerning 
the preference of a particular organizational element, the personal pref- 
erences of the employees, and placement as recommended by the Project 
Manager. Once these steps were completed, arrangements for interviews 
were carried out through the Project Office and, with the assistance of 
the Personnel Division, the reassignments were completed. 
In spite of the fact that there was really no formalization of re- 
assignment procedures in phasing out the Mercury Project Office, the re- 
sults were most satisfactory. There were perhaps only one or two problem 
cases out of the 50 affected employes and each received on the average of 
three to four "good" offers for positions. All were reassigned to fully 
13 
q-;i-:C.e-t ~~sitiais in 5-11 ra.gpc.  and "no one was hurt". 
policy of management at that time to distribute as widely as possible 
across the Center the program management experience of these individuals. 
Because of this policy, however, not all employees were able to realize 
their personal preferences with regard to specific positions. Several 
employees with particular skills were asked by management to continue 
their present work in other organizatims despite preferences by the 
employees to learn new skills. Few employees found themselves in this 
situation. In any event, there is inevitably some conflict between man- 
agement and employee wishes despite all precautions. 
It was the 
There was some degree of dissatisfaction expressed on the part of 
the employees involved regarding the actual procedures which were used 
in the phasedown. One problem that arose was that the Mercury Project 
Office was not able to maintain strict control over employee interviews. 
This phase out took place at a time when the organization of the Center 
itself was not as well institutionalized as it is now and there was a 
more substantial degree of organizational autonomy. It is felt that 
this may have contributed to the fact that many interviews were con- 
ducted outside the auspices of the Mercury Project Office which weakened 
its attempt at controlling them. It was discovered that offers and prom- 
ices regarding some positions had been made to various employees by other 
organizational elements which, according to the Mercury Project Manager, 
they would be unable to fulfill. This no doubt was a cause of future 
dissatisfaction on the part of a few of these employees. As shall be 
seen in the analysis of the Gemini Program Office phasedown, the problem 
of controlling employee interviews and releases was handled in a differ- 
ent manner than in Mercury. 
In general, the phase out of the Mercury Project Office produced 
few problems in regards to reassigning and transferring the employees 
released. The numbers involved were relatively small while the demand 
for these people was great as the Center was rapidly expanding. In 1963, 
Congress looked with favor on the National Aeronautics and Space Admin- 
istration's budget requests removing to a considerable degree this poten- 
tial restriction on employee ceilings. I 
However, several years later when the Gemini program entered its 
final stages, these favorable conditions did not exist. It is to this 
more difficult problem that we now turn. 
P 
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THE PHASE OUT OF THE GmI1JI PP,OC-RAV OFFICE 
I n  Chapter I11 t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  wi th in  t h e  
Because one of t h e  major concerns of t h i s  
o rgan iza t iona l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center and i t s  func- 
t i o n s  were d iscussed  b r i e f l y .  
paper  i s  a d e t a i l e d  examination of t h i s  o f f i c e ,  a more complete discus-  
s i o n  of i t s  organiza t ion  and func t ions  i s  i n  o rde r  a t  t h i s  p o i n t .  (See 
f i g .  2 . )  
The Gemini Program Off ice ,  c r ea t ed  e a r l y  i n  1962, w a s  given t h e  re- 
s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  management of a l l  e f f o r t s  d i r e c t l y  a s soc ia t ed  wi th  
t h e  Gemini Program, under guide l ines  e s t a b l i s h e d  by NASA Headquarters i n  
Washington and t h e  Di rec to r  of t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center.  These re -  
s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  included a l l  t e c h n i c a l ,  ope ra t iona l ,  and admin i s t r a t ive  
matters p e r t a i n i n g  t o  t h e  implementation of t h e  program. I n  a c t u a l  prac-  
t i c e ,  however, NASA Headquarters was not as heavi ly  involved i n  t h e  Gemini 
program as it w a s  i n  Apollo. A s  a r e s u l t ,  d i r e c t i o n  came almost exclu- 
s i v e l y  from t h e  Di rec to r  of t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center and t h e  Program 
Manager loca t ed  at  t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center i n  Houston. 
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The s p e c i f i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of t h i s  Of f i ce  included t h e  e s t a b l i s h -  
i ng  of b a s i c  mission requirements ,  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  development 
of  s p e c i f i c  mission p l ans ;  planning and d i r e c t i n g  t h e  development of  t h e  
Gemini s p a c e c r a f t ,  launch veh ic l e s ,  t a r g e t  v e h i c l e s ,  a s s o c i a t e d  aerospace 
ground equipment, and r e l a t e d  equipment; planning and e s t a b l i s h i n g  qua l i -  
f i c a t i o n ,  r e l i a b i l i t y ,  acceptance,  checkout,  and f l i g h t  t e s t s ,  inc luding  
establ ishment  of d a t a  requirements ,  d a t a  c o l l e c t i o n  methods, and t e s t  
eva lua t ion  and r epor t ing ;  d i r e c t i n g  and c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of 
o t h e r  Government agencies  and ar ranging  f o r  support  from o t h e r  Manned 
Spacecraf t  Center elements,  o ther  Nat ional  Aeronautics and Space Admin- 
i s t r a t i o n  Centers ,  and o t h e r  Government agencies  as r equ i r ed  i n  accom- 
13 plishment of t h e  program. 
I n  view of t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  ques t ion  t h a t  any 
program manager m u s t  be a t e c h n i c a l l y  competent i n d i v i d u a l  i n  o rde r  t o  
proper ly  manage t h e  mult i tudinous func t ions  involved i n  producing t h e  end 
i t e m .  I n  t h i s ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  is  similar t o  f u n c t i o n a l  management and ad- 
m i n i s t r a t i o n .  However, t h e  func t ions  of a program o f f i c e  encompass a 
good d e a l  more than  t h i s  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  r e q u i r e  not only a t e c h n i c a l l y  
competent manager, bu t  one who i s  a l so  capable  of g e n e r a l  management ac- 



































In the case of the Gemini Program Office i t s  resFsnslbiiities, in 
a a i i i t l c n  tc t k s ?  given above, included providing, in conjunction with 
appropriate Manned Spacecraft Center elements, the necessary methods and 
procedures for the establishment of budget and schedules, the eva,lua.tion 
and control of cost and schedales, and the reporting of appropriate finan- 
cial and schedule data. Moreover, this Office had the responsibility for 
supervising and directing industrial contractors in the performance of 
contract work including the preparation of statements of work and other 
documents defining the responsibilities of the contractor, the direction 
and supervision of a contractor's work within the scope of the contract, 
and the determination and implementation of required changes in the scope 
of work through the appropriate contracting offices. 14 
A study of the organization function of the Program Office reveals 
a departure from traditional approaches which is worthy of further dis- 
cussion. The innovation itself was brought about by the almost unbeliev- 
able complexity of the organization interrelationships. It has been es- 
timated that at the peak of Gemini activities the participation included 
the Gemini Program Office, all Manned Spacecraft Center organizational 
elements, all NASA supporting activities, McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, 
Martin-Marietta Corporation, General Dynamics-Convair, Lockheed Missiles 
and Space Company, and all of their associates including more than 50 ma- 
jor contractors, more than 150 subcontractors and a host of vendors and 
suppliers. Support was also provided by the Department of Defense; the 
State Department; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; the 
Department of Commerce; the Atomic Energy Commission; and many others. 1 5  
At the time of the peak of activity in Gemini missions it has been 
reported that more than 25,000 people of the aerospace industry and the 
Government became directly involved.16 Total management responsibility 
for this team rested with the Gemini Program Office which averaged less 
than 200 people. These statistics serve to illustrate the staggering 
size of the endeavor and the tremendous communication and coordination 
tasks which the Program Office faced. Figure 3 shows the number of peo- 
ple at MSC, including the Program Office, by quarter who worked on Gemini. 
The scope of the diverse and scattered organizations participating 
in the program created two major problems: 
munications; and (2) proper control and coordination of the activities of 
the separate participants. Time simply was not available for the conven- 
tional chain of command operation which restricts communication to chan- 
nels, or with counterpart to counterpart at each level with each organiza- 
tion. The need, as had been experienced earlier in the Mercury Project, 
was to develop a group which could insure the widest possible dissemina- 
tion and relay of critical information. 
establishment of management coordinating groups or committees to insure 
(1) adequate and timely com- 
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t h e  highest, c n n r p i v a h l p  i l egree  cf' c z c r d i n a t i o ~  acd c o z t r o l .  Tiis i-eaii l ted 
i n  a p r e c i s i o n  meshing of a l l  t h e  f a c t o r s ,  forces  and func t ions  of t h e  d i -  
ve r se  organiza t ions  s o  t h a t  for  each mission they  merged as one e f f e c t i v e  
organiza t ion .  S imi la r  coord ina t ing  groups wi th  subord ina te  pane ls  wi th  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from a l l  i n t e r e s t e d  organiza t ions  were used i n  s e v e r a l  
a r eas  inc luding  s p a c e c r a f t ,  launch v e h i c l e  deployment, l anding  and re- 
covery ope ra t ions ,  e t c .  
The major dev ia t ion  from t r a d i t i o n a l  organiza t ion  theory  represented  
by t h e s e  organiza t ions  i s  found i n  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  and power of  dec i s ion .  
For example, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of t h e  Gemini Program Off ice  a c t i n g  as t h e  
chairman of t h e  Gemini Launch Vehicle coord ina t ion  group possessed t h e  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  d i r e c t  ac t ion  not normally found i n  similar groups. 
The Gemini Program i t s e l f  i s  unique i n  y e t  another  way. A t  i t s  in -  
cep t ion  it w a s  s t a t e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h a t  t h e r e  would be 1 2  G e m i n i  f l i g h t s  
a l l  of which were planned f o r  completion by January 1, 1967. Therefore ,  
w e  are dea l ing  with a p r o j e c t  with a d e f i n i t e  end po in t .  Although no one 
could be c e r t a i n  as t o  t h e  t iming of i t s  conclusion,  everyone involved 
knew it w a s  going t o  end wi th  t h e  t w e l f t h  f l i g h t .  
By June 1966, t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e  Gemini Program had reached t h e i r  
peak and p res su re  w a s  beginning t o  be put  on t h e  Program Of f i ce  t o  reduce 
t h e  number of i t s  personnel  t o  a g r e a t e r  degree than  w a s  be ing  provided 
by a t t r i t i o n . 1 7  Actual  phase out  a c t i v i t y  and movement of personnel  had 
begun several months before  with t h e  t ransfer  of q u a l i t y  c o n t r o l  techni -  
c i ans  and engineers  from t h e  Resident Manager's Off ice  a t  McDonnell A i r -  
c r a f t  Corporation i n  S t .  Louis t o  t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center i n  Houston 
and o t h e r  NASA i n s t a l l a t i o n s  where a need f o r  t h e s e  people e x i s t e d .  
J u l y  1, 1966, t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  cons i s t ed  of 185 personnel  l o c a t -  
ed p r imar i ly  i n  Houston, most o f  whom where s t i l l  h ighly  involved wi th  
t h e  f i n a l  Gemini missions.  
By 
O f  paramount importance in  planning t h e  f i n a l  movement of  Gemini per-  
sonnel  w a s  t h e  need t o  provide placement procedures which recognized t h e  
needs of t h e  Center and t h e  des i r e s  of t h e  ind iv idua l s  involved,  y e t  which 
maintained firm.management con t ro l  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  and insured  s t a b i l i t y  
f o r  t h e  remaining t o p  p r i o r i t y  Gemini missions.  It was apparent  from t h e  
beginning of t h e  planning f o r  t h e  phase out  t h a t  a s i t u a t i o n  somewhat 
similar t o  Mercury e x i s t e d .  There would be no reduct ion  i n  fo rce  because 
management wanted t o  r e t a i n  t h i s  h ighly  s k i l l e d  and capable  work f o r c e  i n  
which it had such a l a r g e  investment and because t h e r e  w a s  an urgent  need 
f o r  t h e s e  employees elsewhere i n  t h e  organiza t ion .  With t h e  inc reas ing  
workload of t h e  Apollo Spacecraf t  Program O f f i c e ,  t h e  es tab l i shment  of 
t h e  Apollo Applicat ions Program Of f i ce ,  and t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  c r e a t i o n  o f  
t h e  Science and Appl ica t ions  Di rec to ra t e ,  it w a s  imperat ive t h a t  t h e s e  
people  be r e t a i n e d  and p laced  i n  p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  would b e s t  u t i l i z e  t h e i r  
s p e c i a l  s k i l l s .  
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Arrangements had t o  be made t o  p l ace  t h e s e  people i n  o t h e r  p o s i t i o n s  
wi th in  t h e  MSC organiza t ions .  Normally i n  circumstances such as t h i s  t h e  
mat te r  would have been turned  over t o  t h e  Personnel  Divis ion f o r  d i spos i -  
t i o n .  This Division would then  fol low s tandard  procedures by prepar ing  
a l i s t  of t h e  employees who were sub jec t  t o  t r a n s f e r  and, i n  making t h e  
necessary reassignments , would dea l  d i r e c t l y  wi th  t h e  l i n e  supe rv i so r s .  
I n  t h i s  case t h i s  w a s  judged not t o  be t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  or desir- 
ab le  procedure t o  follow. 
t o  be conducted, t h e  t o t a l  concent ra t ion  of t h e  work fo rce  w a s  r equ i r ed  
t o  complete these  s u c c e s s f U l y .  It w a s  decided t h a t  t h e  s t anda rd  proce- 
dures for t h e  reassignment of employees would d i s r u p t  t h e  remaining work 
on t h e  e x i s t i n g  program by con t inua l ly  t ak ing  people out  of t h e  Program 
Off ice .  It w a s  a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  undue concern as t o  what t h e i r  next j obs  
would be w a s  l i k e l y  t o  d i s t r a c t  t h e  employees from t h e  job  at hand which 
w a s  s t i l l  of primary importance. 
Because t h e r e  were s t i l l  s e v e r a l  Gemini f l i g h t s  
It w a s  a l s o  not p o s s i b l e  i n  1966 t o  use t h e  same procedures t o  phase 
out  Gemini as had been used i n  1963 t o  phase out  Mercury because t h e  en- 
vironment w a s  j u s t  not t h e  same. 
i n  t h e  Gemini Program Office w a s  more than  t h r e e  t imes g r e a t e r  t han  t h e r e  
had been i n  t h e  Mercury P r o j e c t  Off ice .  
t o  absorb i n t o  t h e  organiza t ion  at one t ime.  When t h e  50 employees i n  
Mercury were phased out  t h e r e  were 285 vacancies  i n  t h e  Center.  A s  of 
J u l y  1, 1966, t h e r e  were only 246 vacancies ( a  f i g u r e  which w a s  dec l in ing  
monthly) wi th in  which 185 people had t o  be placed.  
s t r e n g t h  of t h e  Center had become s t a b i l i z e d  i n  mid-1966 due t o  NASA Head- 
q u a r t e r s  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  This w a s  due t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  funds were j u s t  not 
as a v a i l a b l e  t o  NASA as they  had been i n  e a r l i e r  yea r s .  
t h e  magnitude of Gemini were being i n i t i a t e d  so  Gemini personnel  could 
not be t r a n s f e r r e d  en masse t o  a new Program Off ice .  
F i r s t  of a l l ,  t h e  number of employees 
This w a s  much too  l a r g e  a group 
Secondly, t h e  t o t a l  
No new programs 
There were t w o  pre l iminary  meetings h e l d  on J u l y  9 and J u l y  1 2  t o  
p l an  f o r  t h e  phasedown and r e s u l t i n g  personnel  reassignments.  
meetings t h e  workload cons idera t ions  ( t a b l e  I )  and t h e  ca t egor i e s  and 
numbers of personnel involved ( t a b l e  11) were determined. 
A t  t h e s e  
One of  the  proposa ls  which emerged from t h e  pre l iminary  meetings w a s  
one acc red i t ed  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  Gemini Program Manager concerning t h e  es tab-  
l ishment  of a "working group" t o  be composed of r ep resen ta t ives  from each 
major MSC organiza t ion  and cha i red  by a Gemini Program Off ice  representa-  
t ive .  The group w a s  a l s o  t o  inc lude ,  as an adv i so r ,  a f u l l y  q u a l i f i e d  
personnel  management s p e c i a l i s t .  It w a s  f e l t  t h a t  such a group would be  
ab le  t o  work e f f e c t i v e l y  both wi th in  and among t h e  var ious o rgan iza t ions  
and would be  ab le  t o  disseminate  a l l  t h e  necessary information without 
t h e  knowledge of t h e  employees involved. This  recommendation w a s  approved 
TABLE I.- WORKLOAD CONSIDERATIONS I N  
PHASEDOWN PLANNING 
Workload 
Launch of Gemini X 
Mission Evaluat ion of Gemini X 
Del ivery of Gemini X I 1  hardware 
Launch of Gemini X I  
Mission Evaluat ion of  Gemini X I  
Launch of Gemini X I 1  
Mission Evaluat ion of Gemini X I 1  
Property Dispos i t ion  
Closeout - Contrac tua l  Af fa i r s  
F i l e s  and Documentation Disposi t ion 
Spec ia l  H i s t o r i c a l  Reports 
Date 
J u l y  
L a t e  August 
Mid- Sep t ember 
Mid-September 
Late  October 
Late October 





Source: MSC Management Document from t h e  Manager, Gemini 
Program Off ice  t o  t h e  Chief,  Personnel  D iv i s ion ,  J u l y  30, 1966 
( i n  t h e  f i l e s  of t h e  Personnel D iv i s ion ) .  
22 
TABLE 11.- CATEGORIES OF PERSCINNEL BEING CONSIDERED* 
Assigned as of July 11, 1966 
Categories 
Permanent Civil Service Personnel 




Summer hires (no action required - appointments 












The grades of the technical professionals involved in this 
reassignment ranged from GS-12 to GS-16. 
group. 
This was quite a senior 
Source: MSC Management Document from the Manager of the 
Gemini Program Office to the Chief, Personnel Division, July 20, 
1966 (in the files of the Personnel Division). 
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by the Deputy fiirectoi- ~ f '  the Manned Spacecraft Center who then estab- 
lished the Administrative Committee. 
P,is comnittee was not given authority to approve the transfer of 
personnel or personnel spaces, but was designed to serve as a communi- 
cation and coordination group which would make recommendations for re- 
assignments to the Deputy Director through the Gemini Program Office 
Manager. The objectives of the committee were to insure that these re- 
assignments would be carried out within a management controlled environ- 
ment to insure the least possible adverse effect on the stability of the 
Gemini Program Office in accomplishing its remaining mission, that 
Center-wide requirements and priorities received adequate consideration 
in the reassignment of these personnel, and that the individuals were 
given the maximum practicable amount of latitude in selecting their new 
assignments. 
At the same time Center management, on the basis of critical pro- 
gram needs, re-allocated all Gemini personnel spaces to other major or- 
ganizational elements. Staffing vouchers were issued which indicated 
newly authorized staffing levels and directed that a specified number of 
vacancies in each organization be reserved for Gemini people. Through- 
out the phase out period the Personnel Division scrutinized all recruit- 
ment actions from outside sources to assure that qualified Gemini per- 
sonnel were given first consideration. 
In conjunction with the completion of the revision of the alloca- 
tion of positions within each organization, each directorate and program 
office was required to prepare a personnel staffing requirements forecast 
through December 31, 1966. They were assisted by the Personnel Division 
in developing the specific format and the overall reporting requirements. 
This Division also provided the committee with the final report on all 
position vacancies approved for consideration. 
In July the Program Manager listed general release dates for most 
Gemini personnel by designating three bi-monthly periods, i.e., July- 
August, September-October, November-December, as release periods for 
individuals so designated. These release dates were again determined 
by the workload considerations shown in table I. The actual release 
date for each individual was approved by the Program Manager after the 
selection process was completed. 
In addition, Gemini supervisors prepared resumes of Gemini person- 
nel emphasizing the Program Office responsibilities and accomplishments 
of each individual and recommending areas of best utilization. Represen- 
tatives from the Personnel Division prepared a list of pertinent infor- 
mation concerning each employee. 
each employee was made available to the committee for its consideration. 
A complete package of information on 
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After each group was identified and resumes and information packets 
compiled, the Administrative Committee was convened to develop placement 
possibilities. 
on the release list. Each member of the committee was responsible for 
circulating the resumes of those in the particular group under consid- 
eration throughout his organization. 
meeting, generally held several days later, with requests to interview 
Gemini personnel and with brief descriptions of the proposed jobs. 
currently, the Program Office representative gave each member a list of 
people the Program Manager felt his organization should consider. The 
interview requests were submitted to the Chief, Personnel Division and 
the Program Manager and, if approved, were then referred back to the 
Administrative representative in the interested areas. At this point 
supervisor-to-supervisor contacts and ultimately interviews were approved 
and scheduled. 
No employee could be considered until his name appeared 
He was then to return to the next 
Con- 
No specific job offers were to be made at these interviews, however. 
They were intended only as a means of providing an informational exchange 
between the GPO employee and the interested division. If it was mutually 
agreeable to both parties, the interested organization then submitted 
such information to the Program Manager who then decided whether or not 
a firm offer could be made. In this way the GPO Manager maintained a 
fairly tight control over the placement of GPO personnel. 
he felt to be undesirable were screened out, and in some cases, without 
an employee ever knowing that he had been considered for a particular 
area. Because of his extremely close relationship with his personnel, 
the Program Manager felt that he was in the best position to know the 
most suitable assignment for an individual and where the individual would 
be the most satisfied. 
Matches which 
This point cannot be overstressed: during the course of not only 
the Gemini program but back into Mercury and before, this relationship 
between the Program Manager and his staff had become quite close indeed. 
Much of this was due to the environment which surrounded the entire 
Center--the challenges of the mission. Due to his senior management 
position in the Center's organizational structure, his knowledge about 
the other organization's and their programs, and his commitment to his 
own people, the Program Manager felt a personal obligation to insure 
that each one of his people was placed in a new position concomitant 
with his experience and capabilities. 
The initial job  contacts were restricted to the Division Chief level 
to insure the strict confidence required to de-emphasize the phasedown 
process. All of the activities of the committee, discussions between 
supervisors, and interviews with individuals were conducted in confidence 
to minimize an unsettling effect on mission-critical employees. Periodi- 
cally, each Gemini employee was to receive a memorandum from the Program 
25 
Manager i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  placement e f f o r t s  were underway and reminding 
each of t h e  c r i t i c a l  mission t a s k s  remaining. 
The Program Manager a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  it should not  be l e f t  up t o  t h e  
ind iv idua l s  t o  f i n d  t h e i r  own jobs  and t h a t  they  should be  informed t h a t  
systematic  a c t i o n  t o  f i n d  p o s i t i o n s  f o r  them was t a k i n g  p l a c e .  Accord- 
i n g l y ,  on August 1 5 ,  1966, a l e t t e r  from him expla in ing  t h a t  phasedown 
a c t i v i t i e s  were underway w a s  given t o  a l l  Gemini Program Of f i ce  person- 
n e l .  The substance of t h i s  l e t t e r  i s  as fol lows:  
Center management, f u l l y  aware of t h e  ind iv idua l  and group 
accomplishments of t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce ,  has e s t a b l i s h -  
ed a review and r e f e r r a l  system which w i l l  i n s u r e  c a r e f u l  
cons idera t ion  of t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and experience of each 
and every ind iv idua l  as they a r e  made a v a i l a b l e  f o r  reass ign-  
ment by GPO. While primary cons idera t ion  must be given t o  
Center requirements ,  t h e r e  w i l l  be  some l a t i t u d e  permi t ted  
f o r  personal  preference  whenever p r a c t i c a b l e .  
We have e s t a b l i s h e d  an  a v a i l a b i l i t y  phasing p l a n  which i s  
based on our remaining mission requirements;  consequently 
you w i l l  be n o t i f i e d  by t h e  manager of your o f f i c e  when you 
are being considered f o r  reassignment.  A t  t h i s  t i m e ,  you 
w i l l  be  contac ted  by organiza t ions  wi th  s p e c i f i c  j ob  assign-  
ments i n  mind which have t h e  concurrence of management. 
U n t i l  such t i m e ,  you a r e  reques ted  t o  r e f r a i n  from making per- 
sona l  con tac t s  regarding reassignment.  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  
approach w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  reassignment f o r  every- 
one which has  t h e  complete support  of Center management. A s  
new developments occur you w i l l  be kept  informed through your 
superv isors .  18 
The admin i s t r a t ive  o f f i c e r  f o r  Gemini des igna ted  by t h e  Program 
Manager, and t h e  Personnel Management S p e c i a l i s t ,  des igna ted  by t h e  
Chief ,  Personnel  Div is ion  were r e spons ib l e  f o r  most of t h e  day-to-day 
coord ina t ion  of placement a c t i v i t y .  The placement of key Gemini person- 
n e l  w a s  coordinated by t h e  Program Manager and approved by t h e  Deputy 
Di rec to r .  All proposed reassignments were reviewed by t h e  Personnel  
Div is ion  p r i o r  t o  process ing  t o  a s s u r e  proper  job  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and 
adherence t o  t h e  MSC Merit Promotion Plan .  I n  view of t h e  i n i t i a l  de- 
c i s i o n s  which were made, i . e . ,  t h a t  t h e r e  would be no r educ t ion  i n  f o r c e  
and t h a t  everyone would be reassigned t o  an equiva len t  p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  
C i v i l  Serv ice  p rov i s ions  had l i t t l e  a f f e c t  on t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  person- 
n e l  i n  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  s i t u a t i o n  and removed a p o t e n t i a l  a d d i t i o n a l  burden 
on dec i s ion  making. 
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In general, this committee placement procedure worked fairly smooth- 
ly. Almost all of the Gemini people had several interview possibilities 
and many received firm job offers from more than one MSC organization. 
One problem which had to be faced concerned the grade level structure in 
the Gemini Program Office. (See fig. 4.) Program Office grade level 
structure has generally been a step higher in grade than functional line 
positions. The complexity of the task of coordinating large programs 
and the managing of contracts valued in the hundred millions of dollars 
require these higher level positions. It is a fact that because higher 
grades are supportable in the program office this results in a greater 
desire on the part of personnel to get into them. On the other hand, it 
a l s o  results in a reluctance on the part of the functional organizations 
to take people from a program office. 
This situation creates the problem of moving in high level person- 
An already established or-  
nel over others in an already established organization. Managers are 
generally Exceptedlg or at the GS-16 level. 
ganization does not have many management or division chief positions 
open. In the case of one of the newer organizations, it is reported 
that there are a number of young supervisors at grade levels below what 
their jobs actually call for. Placing higher level (GS-14 to GS-16) 
Gemini Program Office employees into this organization would most likely 
have resulted in a very real morale problem. To avoid this, many organi- 
zations wanted only the lower level technical professional people and 
clerical people from the Gemini Program Office. 
As might perhaps be expected, most Gemini employees indicated a 
preference for similar positions in other program offices. The result 
was that the great bulk of the professional experience from the Gemini 
Program Office, particularly in regards to key personnel--Assistant Di- 
vision Chief or above in Gemini or their new positions--was absorbed in 
the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office and the Apollo Applications Program 
Office. Of the 124 Gemini professional people who accepted reassignment 
at MSC, 86 were transferred into these areas, including in some instances, 
special task groups that moved intact. Of the 16 key Gemini Program Of- 
fice personnel who accepted new positions, 13 moved to either Apollo 
Spacecraft or Apollo Applications Program Offices at the Manned Space- 
craft Center or the Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA Headquarters. 
The phase out of Gemini personnel in the NASA Resident Manager's 
Office at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, St. Louis, also proceeded in 
an orderly manner. Of the 45 personnel on board as of July 1, 1966, six 
people were reassigned to the newly constituted NASA Resident Manager, 
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, St. Louis to manage another smaller con- 
tract; 13 accepted assignments in Houston; four people went to the MSC 
Apollo Field Office, Downey, California; nine transferred to other NASA 













































c l e r i c a l  and one adminis t ra t ive--decl ined reassignment t o  comparable 
p o s i t i o n s  i n  Houston f o r  personal  reasons ,  and were n o t i f i e d  of proposed 
sepa ra t ion  e f f e c t i v e  March 19 ,  1967. (See t a b l e  111.) 
The break-up of t h e  h ighly  s k i l l e d ,  t i g h t l y - k n i t  t e c h n i c a l  team 
which c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  d i d  not  produce a s i g n i f i c a n t  
number of r e s igna t ions .  Of t h e  185 Gemini personnel  on board J u l y  1, 
1966, 165 are s t i l l  on MSC r o l e s  and four  went t o  o t h e r  NASA organiza- 
t i o n s .  Of t h e  16 people who l e f t  NASA, s i x  were c l e r i c a l ,  t h r e e  were 
admin i s t r a t ive ,  four  were t e c h n i c i a n s ,  and only t h r e e  were engineers .  
Fourteen of the  20 Gemini personnel  who l e f t  MSC r o l e s  had been ass igned  
t o  MSC Gemini o f f i c e s  i n  S t .  Louis (McDonnell), Sunnyvale (Lockheed), o r  
Baltimore (Mart in)  and it may be assumed t h a t  r e luc t ance  t o  l eave  homes 
i n  t h e s e  areas w a s  a major reason f o r  te rmina t ion .  Only s i x  Gemini peo- 
p l e  separa ted  from MSC (Houston) four  of whom were c l e r i c a l  o r  adminis- 
t r a t ive  people who l e f t  f o r  family reasons .  Only two t e c h n i c a l  profes-  
s i o n a l s  l e f t  Houston. The Gemini Program Manager w a s  promoted and re- 
ass igned  t o  t h e  Off ice  of Manned Space F l i g h t ,  NASA Headquarters,  and 
one engineer  res igned  t o  j o i n  p r i v a t e  indus t ry .  
A t  NASA Headquarters ( s e e  f i g .  5 )  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  had al- 
ready begun t o  phase down approximately one yea r  be fo re  completion of  t h e  
program.20 
50 employees would go, and t h e r e  w a s  a good d e a l  of a c t i v i t y  by t h e  f irst  
and second l e v e l  d i r e c t o r s  t o  assure  employees would r ece ive  p o s i t i o n s  
commensurate wi th  t h e i r  a b i l i t i e s .  
Planning began one yea r  be fo re  completion as t o  where i t s  
The i n i t i a l  planning w a s  done on a c o n f i d e n t i a l  l e v e l .  Seve ra l  
meetings were he ld  i n  January through March 1966 t o  d i scuss  t h e  phase 
out  p repa ra t ions .  These d i scuss ions  covered such areas as what t ypes  
of employees would be a v a i l a b l e ,  where t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  were which needed 
t h e s e  t y p e s ,  and where they  might b e s t  be used.  
t o  those  a reas  of t h e  Off ice  of Manned Space F l i g h t  where it w a s  f e l t  
t hey  were most needed. 
da t e s  were est imated.  
t h e  bulk of which would be i n  e a r l y  December. 
Spaces were t r a n s f e r r e d  
A f t e r  t h e s e  dec i s ions  were made t h e  release 
These v a r i e d  from A p r i l  through December of 1966, 
Two ground r u l e s  were e s t a b l i s h e d .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  was assurance given 
t o  t h e  employees t h a t  t hey  would be p laced  i n  a p o s i t i o n  commensurate 
wi th  t h e i r  a b i l i t i e s .  Secondly, t h e  r ece iv ing  o rgan iza t ions  were t o l d  
not  t o  pressure  t h e  employees o r  t o  encourage them t o  assume t h e i r  new 
p o s i t i o n s  before  they  were ready f o r  release. 
There were s e v e r a l  o t h e r  meetings he ld  i n  t h e  next  fou r  t o  f i v e  
months. Discussions began between equiva len t  branch l e v e l s  of t h e  
Headquarters Program Of f i ce  and t h e  areas which w e r e  expanding and 
needed employees. They had access  t o  necessary  in t e rv i ew material on 
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ail t.lfiplojrzee vhn would be released. 
call an employee directly and the employees were e i i c ~ ~ ~ ~ g ; z 2  seek m i t ,  
job possibilities on their own although this was seldom necessary. 
were carefully selected, highly skilled people and their experience was 
very much in demand. 
An interested organization could 
These 
There was no paper contact or questionnaires to employees for they 
were asked to state their preferences by personal contact. 
size of the Program Office and the resulting close contacts made access 
to personnel easy and information readily available. 
kept as fully informed as was possible regarding what actions were tak- 
ing place. 
several "good" offers, the necessary paper work was initiated by the 
receiving organization. 




Once the employee decided which job to take, and most had 
As a result, the only action necessary at the 
By July, all the people were reassigned to positions suitable to 
them and satisfactory to the Headquarters Program Director. It was all 
accomplished with no down grading with the exception of one secretary 
who agreed to the action. Except for some minor adjustments, the phase 
out was executed as planned. The time phasing did require some modifi- 
cation, but generally the releases were earlier than had been expected. 
After the last mission on November 1 5 ,  the transfer of Headquarters 
The hard core of employees at the end were personnel increased rapidly. 
key people who already had made their plans, but were needed until the 
completion of flight activity. 
with the exception of three people who were left to handle the closing of 
the office. 
The transfer was completed by December 19, 
CHAF'TER VI 
THE PHASE OUT OF THE GEMINI PKOGRAM OFFICE AS 
VIEWED BY MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS 
Having examined the policies and procedures which were used in the 
Phase out of the Gemini Program Office at MSC, the next step was to de- 
termine how those who had participated in the phase out activities re- 
acted to these methods. To obtain this information personal interviews 
were arranged with the Gemini Program Manager; Deputy Program Manager; 
Chief, Personnel Division; Deputy Chief, Personnel Division; five mem- 
bers of the Administrative Committee; and the Personnel Management Spec- 
ialist who assisted the committee. 
One purpose of these interviews was to question these people regard- 
ing their personal roles in the phase out. This information provided 
most of the details presented in the preceding chapter. In addition, 
they were asked for their opinions concerning the procedures and whether 
or not they considered the results to be satisfactory. Further, they 
were asked for recommendations for any changes they felt would improve 
the process in the future. Those in organizations which had received 
Gemini employees were also asked if any adjustment problems of these 
21 employees to their new organizations were in evidence at this time. 
The consensus of opinion expressed by management was that the phase 
out, in general, had been handled quite well. A l l  agreed with the poli- 
cies, but there were some objections voiced about some of the mechanisms 
used. Of those interviewed, only one member of the Administrative Com- 
mittee felt that there had been no problems whatsoever and, therefore, 
no suggestions for its improvement were required. 
The others offered several criticisms of the procedures and made a 
number of suggestions for their improvement. They disagreed primarily 
with the attempt to keep the activities that were taking place with re- 
gard to the phase out strictly confidential. As was mentioned earlier, 
the Program Manager had decided not to inform all the employees at the 
same time of their pending release. 
worry about their future positions to those who could not be released 
until later. Thus, three separate release lists were compiled according 
to the date of anticipated availability. It is claimed, however, that 
this attempt at secrecy produced a tendency to create more problems than 
it solved. 
He did not want to cause undue 
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I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  everyone knew t h a t  t h e  program w a s  going t o  end 
i n  t h e  very  near f u t u r e .  
would be happening t o  them and what t h e i r  f u t u r e  jobs  would be w a s  f e l t  
t o  have been a cause f o r  g r e a t e r  worry. Secondly, several of t hose  in-  
terviewed expressed some concern wi th  t h e  gene ra l  i d e a  of managing i n  
s e c r e t  and f e l t  t h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  undes i r ab le  when d e c i s i o n s  are being 
made t h a t  a f f e c t  a n  employee's f u t u r e  c a r e e r .  F u r t h e r ,  some f e l t  t h a t  
more was l o s t  i n  employee morale r e s u l t i n g  from misinformation from in -  
formal sources which r e s u l t e d  i n  g r e a t e r  concern,  much of it unfounded, 
t h a n  w a s  gained from t r y i n g  t o  maintain s t r i c t  confidence.  
The f a c t  t h a t  t hey  were not  informed as t o  what 
The suggest ion w a s  made t h a t  t h i s  could have been improved by t h e  
use  of a gene ra l  announcement t o  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  employees. 
This  could have been done through t h e  means of a meeting where t h e  prob- 
l e m s  and proposed a c t i o n  would be explained as thoroughly as poss ib l e .  
The same arrangements could a l s o  have been used f o r  conducting t h e  in-  
te rv iews  with t h e  same proviso  made t h a t  no one at tempt  t o  make any ar- 
rangement on h i s  own. While admi t t ing  t h e r e  might be some except ions ,  
it i s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  ma jo r i ty  would have m e t  t h e s e  demands as they  actu-  
a l l y  d i d  under t h e  system which w a s  used. 
s h i p  between t h e  Program Manager and h i s  employees, however, t h e i r  con- 
f idence  i n  him w a s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  fo l low h i s  assurance t h a t  a l l  would be 
reass igned  t o  comparable p o s i t i o n s .  
Because of t h e  c l o s e  r e l a t i o n -  
Under t h i s  arrangement t h e  use  of only one r e l e a s e  l i s t  would have 
been both  necessary and p r e f e r a b l e .  
have been d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  a l l  Div is ion  Chiefs  who would then  i n d i c a t e  
those  ind iv idua l s  i n  whom they  were i n t e r e s t e d  and f o r  which p o s i t i o n s .  
These l i s t s  then  could have been r e tu rned  t o  t h e  Adminis t ra t ive  Committee 
which could have followed t h e  same procedures f o r  a r ranging  in t e rv i ews ,  
screening out t hose  considered undes i r ab le ,  and approving f i rm o f f e r s .  
The only s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  would have been al lowing a l l  employees 
t o  interview at  t h e  same t i m e  and t o  make arrangements f o r  f u t u r e  posi-  
t i o n s .  
Copies of t h i s  r e l e a s e  l i s t  could 
It i s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  use  of one release l i s t  might have prevented 
t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  f r u s t r a t i o n  on t h e  p a r t  of  t h o s e  employees who w e r e  on 
t h e  f irst  r e l e a s e  l i s t ,  bu t  f o r  one reason o r  another  were s t i l l  not  
p laced  a t  the  t i m e  t h e  las t  l i s t  w a s  made a v a i l a b l e .  Fu r the r ,  t hose  in -  
terviewed who represented  o rgan iza t ions  t h a t  rece ived  Gemini people  
s t a t e d  t h a t  i f  they  had known they  were g e t t i n g  t h e  ind iv idua l  t hey  con- 
s ide red  t o  be t h e  r i g h t  person f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o s i t i o n ,  t hey  would have 
been w i l l i n g  t o  hold t h a t  p o s i t i o n  open f o r  s e v e r a l  months u n t i l  h i s  
Gemini r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  were completed. 
One c r i t i c i s m  o f f e r e d  by s e v e r a l  members of t h e  Administrative Com- 
mit tee  w a s  t h a t  t h e  procedures  used were t o o  t i m e  consuming and, as a 
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r e su l t ,  were extended over  too lon5 8 peris?.  As ~ $ 2  discussed  i n  t h e  
preceaing chap te r ,  t h e  members r e tu rned  t o  t h e i r  o rgan iza t ions  wi th  a 
l i s t  of t hose  Gemini employees a v a i l a b l e  f o r  r e l e a s e .  Those on t h e  l i s t  
were t o  be d iscussed  and an i n d i c a t i o n  made as t o  those  an o r g a n i z a t i s n  
wished t.o in te rv iew.  A f t e r  a r eques t  f o r  in te rv iew w a s  submit ted t o  t h e  
committee, it i s  r epor t ed  t h a t  it took from t h r e e  t o  f o u r  weeks due t o  
t h e  "normal" demands of t h e  program before  permission t o  in te rv iew w a s  
g ran ted  by t h e  Program Manager. It then  usua l ly  took  s e v e r a l  days be- 
f o r e  a t ime f o r  t h e  interview could be arranged.  If t h e  in t e rv i ew was 
mutual ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t e d  organiza t ion  had t o  have permis- 
s i o n  from t h e  Program Manager a second t i m e  before  making a firm o f f e r .  
These same s t e p s  had t o  be repea ted  wi th  each of t h e  t h r e e  sepa ra t e  r e -  
lease l i s t s .  
I n  t h e  opinion of t h e s e  people ,  t h e  Div is ion  Chiefs  were simply 
" too bogged down i n  paper work." There w a s  a f e e l i n g  t h a t  t h e  forms 
used t o  provide them wi th  employee information were inadequate .  The 
r ece iv ing  o rgan iza t ions  spent  t o o  much t ime searching f o r  t h e i r  own in-  
formation. Although t h e  personnel f i l e s  were made a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e r e  s i m -  
p l y  w a s  not s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  c a l l  f o r  and examine them. They found 
themselves r e l y i n g  on t h e  word of people who were familiar wi th  a par- 
t i c u l a r  employee which could l ead  t o  some misconceptions.  
It w a s  suggested,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  a l l  p e r t i n e n t  information on any 
One suggested t h a t  what could have been used w a s  an employee's 
one employee be ga thered  toge ther  on one form r a t h e r  than  t h r e e  s e p a r a t e  
ones. 
l a s t  promotion papers  as they  provide t h e  necessary information.  
It w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  from Chapter V t h a t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  beginning of 
t h e  a c t u a l  phase out t h e  personnel spaces a l l o t t e d  t o  t h e  Gemini Program 
Off ice  were r e -a l loca ted  t o  o ther  major organiza t ion  elements throughout 
t h e  Center on t h e  basis of c r i t i c a l  program needs.  This  meant t h a t  a 
Gemini employee d i d  not  t a k e  h i s  space wi th  him when he t r a n s f e r r e d ,  bu t  
had t o  be p laced  wi th in  an o rgan iza t ion ' s  a l lowable personnel  c e i l i n g .  
When t h e  spaces  were d i s t r i b u t e d  t h e r e  w a s  a "must-hire quota" s e t ;  i . e . ,  
each organiza t ion  had t o  h i r e  a s p e c i f i e d  number of Gemini people .  
A complaint voiced by some of t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  of t h e  r ece iv ing  
o rgan iza t ions  on t h i s  p o i n t  was t h a t  t h e s e  quotas were not enforced as 
they  should have been. This  non-enforcement was somewhat understandable  
i n  t h a t  t h e  quotas  were f e l t  t o  have been ' ' un rea l i s t i c ' '  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
p l ace .  What r e s u l t e d  was an organiza t ion  r ece iv ing  an inc rease  i n  i t s  
al lowable spaces without  be ing  requi red  t o  t a k e  any Gemini people .  A t  
t h e  same t i m e  o t h e r  organiza t ions  who wanted more Gemini employees d id  
not  have t h e  spaces f o r  them. It w a s  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  could have been 
avoided i f  t h e  spaces had gone with t h e  people  as i n  t h e  Mercury phase 
out  and would have eased some of t h e  placement problems which evolved. 
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Another apparent problem came t o  l i g h t  during t h e  course of i n t e r -  
Due t o  t h e  na tu re  of t h e  Gemini pro- 
Because of t h e i r  
Moreover, because of t h e  grade l e v e l  of 
viewing t h e  management personnel .  
gram, t h e  t ime phasing of t h e  r e l e a s e s  depended on an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  re- 
s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  on t h e  remaining t h r e e  Gemini f l i g h t s .  
r o l e s ,  t he re fo re ,  it w a s  necessary t h a t  most key people  be he ld  u n t i l  
t h e  completion of t h e  program. 
t h i s  group, t h e i r  reassignments were not  handled by t h e  Adminis t ra t ive  
Committee, per  se, bu t  were t h e  personal  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  Program 
Manager. 
Whether it w a s  i n  f a c t  t h e  case ,  employees who found themselves on 
t h e  l a te r  release l i s t s  w e r e  concerned t h a t  t hose  r e l e a s e d  ear l ier  would 
g e t  t h e  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n s  simply because of t h e i r  a v a i l a b i l i t y .  From 
l a t e r  in te rv iews  wi th  t h e s e  key people it does appear t h a t  t h o s e  who had 
t o  be he ld  u n t i l  t h e  end of t h e  program d i d  i n  f a c t  experience some con- 
cern  about t h e i r  f u t u r e  f o r  t h i s  reason.  
It i s  here t h a t  w e  f i n d  ourse lves  involved wi th  what can be consid- 
e red  an inherent  c o n f l i c t  i n  manager-employee r e l a t i o n s .  The employees, 
n a t u r a l l y  concerned about t h e i r  f u t u r e  c a r e e r s ,  were anxious t o  f i n d  
s u i t a b l e  pos i t i ons .  With t h e  immense complexity of t h e  Gemini program 
and t h e  t o t a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  i t s  success  p laced  on t h e  shoulders  of  
t h e  Program Manager, he w a s  faced wi th  a dilemma. He f e l t  t h a t  t h e  peo- 
p l e  under h i s  command were t h e  b e s t  people he could have. H e  w a s  s in-  
c e r e l y  concerned about f ind ing  t h e  r i g h t  p o s i t i o n  f o r  each of them. H e ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  wanted t o  maintain some c o n t r o l  over t h e i r  placement i n  addi- 
t i o n  t o  p lac ing  t h e s e  key people h imsel f .  
However, it should be remembered t h a t  Gemini w a s  s t i l l  f l y i n g  a t  
t h i s  t i m e .  This  was h i s  f irst  and most important r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Ac- 
cording t o  t h e  Program Manager, "The success  of  t h e  l as t  mission was 
j u s t  as o r  more important t han  t h e  f i r s t " . * *  
t o  be away from t h e  Center a good d e a l  of t h e  t ime and made it impossible  
f o r  him t o  devote as much t ime t o  t h e  placement problem as he would have 
l i k e d .  
H i s  d u t i e s  r equ i r ed  him 
It i s  t h i s  aspec t  which fu rn i shes  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e  complaints men- 
t i o n e d  earlier t h a t  t h e  procedures took t o o  much t i m e .  It w a s  suggested 
by a number of t hose  interviewed t h a t  it would have perhaps been b e t t e r  
i f  t h e  Program Manager had de lega ted  t h e s e  placement r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  t o  
someone whose judgment he t r u s t e d  and who could have devoted f u l l  t i m e  
t o  t h e s e  e f f o r t s .  Rather t han  having only one man t o  assist him, it 
would have a l s o  been p r e f e r a b l e  t o  have t h r e e  or f o u r  assistants working 
at t h i s  f u l l  t i m e .  It i s  f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  system would have made it pos- 
s i b l e  t o  complete t h e  arrangements f o r  t h e  phase out  i n  a s h o r t e r  pe r iod  
of t i m e .  
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ilowever , having deiegaieir  liiese r e s p o i i s i b i l i t i e a  t o  SGZCGEC ;;k;e 
could devote f u l l  time t o  it would not  n e c e s s a r i l y  have so lved  t h e  prob- 
l e m  of p l ac ing  t h e  key people.  
d i scussed  i n  Chapter V r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  h igher  grade level  s t r u c t u r e  
i n  t h e  Program Office.  
would have been d i f f i c u l t  t o  p lace  under any system. 
Manager s t a t e d :  
h ighe r  s l o t s  and handled them e f f e c t i v e l y ,  but  t h e r e  w a s  not  enough room 
f o r  them i n  t h e  organiza t ion .  
Here w e  are dea l ing  wi th  t h e  problems 
These people,  because of  t h e i r  grade levels ,  
As t h e  Program 
"Many of my managers and deput ies  could have gone i n t o  
I I  23 
I n  t h i s  case  o f  t h e  key people ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  use  o f  one release 
l i s t  would have perhaps eased  t h e i r  worry t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  employees ava i l -  
a b l e  would have a b e t t e r  opportuni ty  t o  f i n d  t h e  be t te r  p o s i t i o n s .  
ever, it s t i l l  would not  have solved t h e  placement problem caused by 
t h e i r  grade levels.  On t h e  whole, however, t h e  above problems notwith- 
s tanding ,  a l l  key personnel  were p laced  and, i n  most ca ses ,  t i m e  has  
shown t h e s e  reassignments t o  be s a t i s f a c t o r y .  
How- 
One ques t ion  which w a s  d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  Program Manager concerned 
t h e  breaking up o f  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice  team. 
j e c t i v e s  of  t h e  phase out t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  disbanding of t h e  Gemini Pro- 
gram Off ice  personnel?  
some ex ten t  an i n t e n t i o n a l  disbanding of  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice  team. 
This  w a s  due p r imar i ly  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t o  t h e  Di rec to r  of  t h e  Manned 
Spacecrar t  Center t h e  next program i s  always t h e  most c r i t i c a l  and, as 
a r e s u l t ,  he must i n s u r e  t h a t  t he  new programs r ece ive  t h e  b e n e f i t  of 
experience from t h e  o l d .  However, once t h i s  move t o  put  t h i s  k ind  of 
experience i n t o  a new organiza t ion  i s  made, extreme caut ion  must be ob- 
served.  Ehployees cannot be t r a n s f e r r e d  ind i sc r imina te ly  i n t o  an ongo- 
i n g  organiza t ion .  
Was one of  t h e  ob- 
According t o  t h e  Program Manager, t h e r e  w a s  t o  
Severa l  of t hose  interviewed wanted t o  r e t a i n  t h e  i n t e g r i t y  o f  t h e  
Gemini team and t h e  Program Manager admit ted t o  having had t o  f i g h t  h i s  
own f e e l i n g s  on t h i s  at times. The most s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  which must 
be recognized, however, i s  t h a t  "what may be  considered a good job  one 
year may not  be good t h e  next year" .  
t h e r e  i s  no " c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n "  and l i t t l e  t r a n s f e r  of information 
from o t h e r  organiza t ions .  
i n  t h e  long run ,  prove t o  be i n  t h e  best i n t e r e s t s  of bo th  t h e  Center 
and i t s  personnel .  
Without changes i n  an o rgan iza t ion  
Thus , t h e  disbanding of  t h e  Gemini team w i l l ,  
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EMPLOYEE REACTIONS TO THE PHASE OUT 
Now that the opinions and suggestions from those responsible for 
the development and implementation of the Gemini Program Office phase 
out policies and procedures have been presented, we will proceed to the 
discussion of the reactions expressed by the affected employees. What 
follows, therefore, are the comments and suggestions of those employees 
whose reassignments were handled through the procedures described in 
Chapter V. 
Because of the large number involved, it was not practical to try 
to interview personally even a sampling of this group. Therefore, a 
questionnaire was devised and distributed to 167 former Gemini Program 
Office employees. 
returned. 
Of the number distributed 101, or 60.5 percent, were 
25 
We were interested not only in discovering the reactions of these 
employees to the procedures, but also wanted to determine how successful, 
in their opinion, the objectives of the procedures had been. 
It will be recalled that one of the objectives of the methods was 
to avoid an unsettling affect on the remaining three Gemini missions. 
To accomplish this, all the activities of the committee, discussions be- 
tween supervisors, and interviews with individuals were to be conducted 
in confidence. We therefore asked the employees if they were aware that 
the reassignment of personnel had begun before they were officially noti- 
fied of their release for interviews. Of the 97 people who answered this 
question, only 7 said they were not aware. The balance, 92.8 percent, 
claimed to have been aware of it on the average of two to three months 
before they were officially notified. 
Another of the objectives of the procedures was to prevent possible 
chaos resulting from employees making their own contacts to find new 
positions. In the August 1 5  memorandum from the Program Manager, they 
were specifically requested "to refrain from making personal contacts 
regarding reassignment." We therefore asked the employees what action 
they had taken on their own behalf. Of the 91 who answered this ques- 
tion 83, or 91.2 percent, stated they had taken no action as requested. 
The remaining eight people said they had made contacts with personnel 
with whom they were acquainted to find out what positions were or might 
be available. 
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A f u r t h e r  examination of t h i s  l a t te r  group shows t h a t  a l l  had en- 
t e r e d  i n t o  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  from o u t s i d e  t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  
Center and NASA. Two came from p r i v a t e  indus t ry  while  t h e  remainder 
came t o  MSC from o t h e r  government agencies .  With t h e  except ion of one 
s e c r e t a r y  who had approximately one and one h a l f  yea r s  of  Fede ra l  ser- 
v i c e ,  t h e  members of t h i s  group were t e c h n i c a l  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  wi th  Fed- 
e ra l  s e r v i c e  ranging from 1 1 . 5  yea r s  t o  25 y e a r s  wi th  an average of 
16.4 yea r s .  These people a l s o  had t h e  r e p u t a t i o n  of be ing  t h e  "Old 
Guard" i n  t h e  Program Off ice .  
The f a c t  t h a t  t hose  who f e l t  a need t o  t a k e  some a c t i o n  on t h e i r  
own behal f  came from t h e s e  p a r t i c u l a r  backgrounds could prove t o  be of 
i n t e r e s t .  I n  p r i v a t e  indus t ry  g e n e r a l l y ,  when an employee's p o s i t i o n  
i s  e l imina ted  it  i s  not  unusual f o r  him merely t o  be r e l eased .  Tradi- 
t i o n a l l y ,  i n  government agencies ,  t h e  agency may announce an employee's 
pending a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  bu t  then  t h e  employee i s  l e f t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  on 
h i s  own t o  f i n d  and s e l e c t  a new p o s i t i o n .  It i s  e n t i r e l y  con jec tu re ,  
o f  course ,  but perhaps previous experience wi th  a s i t u a t i o n  of t h i s  
n a t u r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  wi th  t h e  l eng th  of Fede ra l  s e r v i c e  involved,  could 
have l e d  these  p a r t i c u l a r  employees t o  suspec t  t h e  assurance t h a t  com- 
parable  pos i t i ons  wi th in  t h e  Center would be found f o r  them. 
The Program Manager's primary concern w a s  of n e c e s s i t y  t h e  success  
of t h e  remaining t h r e e  f l i g h t s .  
work f o r c e  on t h e i r  Gemini r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  For those  who were aware 
t h e  phase down had begun before  they  were n o t i f i e d ,  d i d  t h i s  pe r iod  of 
unce r t a in ty  regarding t h e i r  f u t u r e  p o s i t i o n s  a f f e c t  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  
concent ra te  on t h e s e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ?  O f  t h e  91 respondents ,  65.9 per- 
cen t  claimed t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  no e f f e c t  on t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  The 
remaining 34.1 percent  s t a t e d  t h a t  it d i d  have some e f f e c t ,  b u t  i n  vary- 
ing  degrees .  
t i o n  from not knowing what w a s  going t o  happen. Severa l  expressed having 
f ea red  t h a t  by t h e  t i m e  t hey  were r e l e a s e d  f o r  in te rv iew a l l  t h e  be t te r  
p o s i t i o n s  would be gone. There a l s o  w a s  evidence given t h a t  a good d e a l  
of t i m e  w a s  wasted i n  informal  d iscuss ions  as personnel  specula ted  among 
themselves regarding what was t ak ing  p l ace .  
H e  needed t h e  f u l l  concent ra t ion  of t h e  
A number claimed t o  have experienced a sense of f r u s t r a -  
The employees were asked i f  they  f e l t  t hey  had a thorough knowledge 
of t h e  reassignment p o l i c i e s  and procedures  used. 
ed ,  51.0 percent  answered i n  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e .  
s a i d  y e s ,  but d i d  s o . w i t h  a number of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  
36.5 percent  claimed they  d i d  not  have such knowledge. 
O f  t h e  96 who respond- 
An a d d i t i o n a l  12.5 pe rcen t  
The remaining 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y  enough, t h e  comments made by t h e  employees i n  response 
t o  t h i s  quest ion were similar i n  many r e s p e c t s  t o  t h o s e  e l i c i t e d  from t h e  
in te rv iews  with t h o s e  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  phase ou t .  One common complaint 
w a s  t h a t  " conf l i c t ing  o r a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  were t h e  only sources  of informa- 
t i on" .  This problem w a s  no doubt due t o  t h e  at tempt  t o  keep every th ing  
c o n f i d e n t i a l .  Speculat ion regarding t h e  unknown more o f t en  than  not  re- 
s u l t s  i n  unfounded rumors and inaccura t e  information.  
Another f a i r l y  common comment w a s  t h a t  an employee thought he un- 
ders tood t h e  p o l i c i e s  and procedures u n t i l  he began h i s  in te rv iews .  It 
would appear t h a t  i n  numerous in s t ances  t h e  system d i d  not  work t h e  way 
i n  which it w a s  intended.  Upon a r r i v i n g  a t  an in t e rv i ew it developed 
t h a t  t h e  interviewer o f t e n  had l i t t l e  o r  no knowledge regard ing  t h e  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  employees he w a s  in te rv iewing .  Many had not  seen 
a copy of t h e  prepared resumes. 
understand t h e  purpose of t h e  in t e rv i ew and thought t hey  were being of- 
f e r e d  a s p e c i f i c  p o s i t i o n  which, i n  a c t u a l i t y ,  w a s  not t h e  case .  I n  
some ins t ances  it appeared t o  t h e  employees t h a t  t h e  in t e rv i ewer  d i d  
not have any s p e c i f i c  pos i t i on  i n  mind f o r  them. A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e s e  
in te rv iews  were compared t o  a "merry-go-round wi th  n e i t h e r  t h e  i n t e r -  
viewer nor t h e  interviewee knowing where t o  g e t  of f" .  
A number of employees seemed t o  m i s -  
A number of  employees, t h e r e f o r e ,  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  paper work of t h e  
process  w a s  inadequate and as a r e s u l t  t ime was wasted i n  a number of 
in te rv iews .  They, t o o ,  suggested t h a t  t h e  forms be improved t o  provide 
s u f f i c i e n t  information and requested t h a t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  only in te rv iews  
f o r  s p e c i f i c  p o s i t i o n s  be conducted. 
A f t e r  asking whether o r  not  they  f e l t  t hey  should have been b r i e f e d  
thoroughly enough, we asked i f  t hey  f e l t  t hey  should have been b r i e f e d  
sooner regard ing  t h e  phase out a c t i v i t i e s .  Of t h e  98 who responded t o  
t h i s  ques t ion ,  65.3 percent  s a i d  no, 25.5 percent  s a i d  y e s ,  4 . 1  percent  
s a i d  they  were b r i e f e d  soon enough, bu t  t h a t  it should have been more 
thorough, and 5 . 1  percent  s a id  t h a t  t hey  had never been b r i e f e d  a t  a l l .  
One ground r u l e  of t h e  e s t ab l i shed  procedures w a s  t o  t r y  t o  a l low 
a l l  t h e  employees some l a t i t u d e  wherever p r a c t i c a b l e  i n  s e l e c t i n g  t h e i r  
own p o s i t i o n s .  Allowing a choice of p o s i t i o n s  such as t h i s  i s  gene ra l ly  
not  t o o  commonplace e i t h e r  i n  p r i v a t e  indus t ry  o r  t h e  Government. 
were t h e r e f o r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  whether or  not  t h e  employees f e l t  t hey  had 
an oppor tuni ty  t o  choose t h e  type  of work t o  which they  were assigned.  
O f  t h e  97 who answered t h i s  ques t ion ,  63.6 percent  s a i d  yes  whi le  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  15.5 percent  s a i d  yes  wi th in  t h e  l i m i t s  allowed under t h e  
procedures used. (It w i l l  be r e c a l l e d  t h a t  t h e  number of in te rv iews  
allowed was r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h r e e  o r  f o u r  i n  most ca ses . )  It w a s  i nd i -  
ca t ed  by 30.9 percent  t h a t  they d i d  not  f e e l  t hey  had any choice regard- 
ing  t h e i r  reassignments .  
We 
Would they  have p re fe r r ed  t o  choose and ar range  t h e i r  own i n t e r -  
views? O f  t h e  91 respondents only 29.7 percent  s a i d  they  would. Another 
9.9 percent  s a i d  they  would have p r e f e r r e d  t o  choose i f  t hey  had been 
provided wi th  a l i s t  of p o s i t i o n s  which were a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  Center at 
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t h e  t i m e .  
choose and arrange t h e i r  in te rv iews .  
s a i d  they  i n  a c t u a l i t y  d i d  choose and ar range  t h e i r  own in te rv iews .  
one of t h i s  group, however, acknowledged having taken  any a c t i o n  on h i s  
own behal f  p r i o r  t o  being o f f i c i a l l y  n o t i f i e d  of  h i s  r e l e a s e  f o r  i n t e r -  
view. The o the r s  s t a t e d  they  had t o  a r range  t h e i r  own interviews because 
t h e  system did not t a k e  c a r e  of  them adequately.  
a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  ques t ionna i r e ,  it appears  t h a t  t h i s  group i s  l a r g e l y  
composed of those  at t h e  h ighe r  grade l e v e l s  f o r  whom f e w  comparable 
p o s i t i o n s  were a v a i l a b l e .  
However, 48.3 percent  s a i d  they  would not  have p r e f e r r e d  t o  
There w a s  another  1 2 . 1  pe rcen t  who 
Only 
From t h e  information 
We were e s p e c i a l l y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  employees' a t t i t u d e s  concerning 
t h e  r e s u l t s  of t h e  procedures which were used. 
information,  we asked them if they  f e l t  they  had been reass igned  t o  posi-  
t i o n s  cons i s t en t  wi th  t h e i r  background and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and where t h e i r  
s k i l l s  could b e s t  be u t i l i z e d .  
percent  s a i d  they  had been. 
t hose  who claimed they  were not  given an oppor tuni ty  t o  choose t h e i r  
new p o s i t i o n s ,  and at  t h e  same t ime s t a t e d  they  would have p r e f e r r e d  t o  
choose. Thus, i t  would appear t h a t  almost 90 percent  of t hose  who were 
d i s s a t i s f i e d  with t h e  procedures f o r  choosing and ar ranging  t h e i r  i n t e r -  
views and new p o s i t i o n s  were at t h e  same t i m e  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  t h e  posi-  
t i o n s  which they  rece ived .  
To provide us  wi th  t h i s  
O f  t h e  95 who answered t h i s  query,  76.9 
Included i n  t h i s  group were 89.7 percent  of 
However, 14 .7  percent  of t h e  respondents  f e l t  they  had not  been re- 
ass igned  t o  pos i t i ons  cons i s t en t  wi th  t h e i r  background and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
or where t h e i r  s k i l l s  could b e s t  be u t i l i z e d .  Fu r the r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  re- 
vealed t h a t  ha l f  of t h i s  group d i d  not t r a n s f e r  i n t o  o t h e r  program of- 
f i c e s ,  bu t  were reass igned  t o  func t iona l  l i n e  o rgan iza t ions .  Thei r  major 
complaint was t h a t  they  were not  given as much r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e i r  
new pos i t i ons  as they  had i n  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice .  
one respondent s t a t e d :  
j ob  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  were minimal compared t o  Gemini." 
For example, 
"AS soon as I began in te rv iewing  I r e a l i z e d  t h a t  
We learned  from our  d i scuss ion  i n  Chapter I1 t h a t  t h e  d u t i e s  and re- 
s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of an employee i n  a program o f f i c e  are gene ra l ly  of a 
broader  na ture  t h a n  those  i n  a func t iona l  l i n e  p o s i t i o n .  The na tu re  of 
t h e  programs a t  MSC and t h e  emphasis p laced  on them means t h a t  much of 
t h e  work i n  t h e  func t iona l  o rgan iza t iona l  elements provides  t h e  support  
t o  t h e  program o f f i c e s .  
t h o s e  interviewed who were from t h e s e  f u n c t i o n a l  o rgan iza t ions  which re -  
ce ived  Gemini employees, t h e s e  employees had some d i f f i c u l t y  a d j u s t i n g  
t o  t h e  more narrow range of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  t h e i r  new p o s i t i o n s .  
employee response t o  t h i s  ques t ion  would appear t o  support  t h i s  observa- 
t i o n .  
Ear l ier  it w a s  mentioned t h a t ,  according t o  
The 
' I n  add i t ion ,  t h e  employees were a l s o  asked i f ,  i n  t h e i r  op in ion ,  
most Gemini Program Off i ce  personnel  had been ass igned  t o  p o s i t i o n s  
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wnere they  can perform most e f f e c t i v e l y .  O f  t h e  74 who answered t h i s  
quest ion 60.8 percent  said yes.  
e ra l ,  bu t  made re ferences  t o  some ins t ances  where t h i s  w a s  not always 
t h e  case.  
Another 25.7 percent  s a i d  yes  i n  gen- 
The remainder, 13.5 pe rcen t ,  claimed t h i s  w a s  not gene ra l ly  t h e  
case.  For ty  percent  of t h e  respondents i n  t h i s  group a l s o  had ind ica t ed  
they  f e l t  t hey  had not been assigned t o  p o s i t i o n s  cons i s t en t  wi th  t h e i r  
background and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and where t h e i r  own s k i l l s  could b e s t  be 
u t i l i z e d .  The o t h e r s  r e f e r r e d  t o  informal  conversa t ions  wi th  t h e i r  ac- 
quaintances as t h e  basis f o r  t h e i r  answers. 
Because of t h e  inc reas ing ly  important r o l e  program management i s  
p lay ing  i n  today ' s  o rgan iza t ions ,  w e  decided it would prove va luable  t o  
ask t h e  Gemini employees how they  f e l t  about t h e i r  program o f f i c e  experi-  
ence. Although it w a s  not  d i r e c t l y  app l i cab le  t o  t h e  phase out  proce- 
dures  o r  t h e i r  r e s u l t s ,  w e  asked them f o r  an opinion as t o  how t h i s  ex- 
per ience  prepared them for work i n  o t h e r  MSC organ iza t iona l  elements.  
Thei r  comments were overwhelmingly favorable  regard ing  t h e  type  of 
working experience they  had gained i n  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice .  
of t h e  most f r equen t ly  mentioned comments w a s  t h a t  t h i s  experience pro- 
vided them wi th  an o v e r a l l  p i c t u r e  of t h e  Center ' s  programs and organi-  
z a t i o n  not gene ra l ly  a v a i l a b l e  i n  o the r  elements.  
ness  of support  requirements of a program o f f i c e  and helped one t o  
understand all f a c e t s  of t h e  job t o  be done r a t h e r  t han  only one s m a l l  
p a r t  of it. A s  a r e s u l t ,  those  who are then  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  f u n c t i o n a l  
organiza t ions  f i n d  they  have a more sympathetic approach t o  program of- 
f i c e  problems. This  type of experience provided many wi th  t h e  o r i en ta -  
t i o n  necessary t o  i n t e g r a t e  i n t o  o t h e r  MSC opera t ions  very e a s i l y .  It 
stressed t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  work and communicate wi th  people of v a r i e d  in-  
t e r e s t s  and exposed them t o  management type  problems on a much broader  
Sca le  than  e x i s t s  i n  most Center organiza t ions .  It t augh t  them how t o  
work wi th  con t r ac to r  personnel  c o n s t r u c t i v e l y  and prepared them t o  cope 
wi th  a l l  types  of s i t u a t i o n s  and p res su res .  
One 
It provided an aware- 
Another f r equen t ly  mentioned advantage i n  t h i s  t ype  of experience 
i s  t h a t  it inc reases  t h e  range and scope of o v e r a l l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and 
c a p a b i l i t y .  This  i n  i t se l f  has been mentioned as one reason why a num- 
b e r  of t h e  employees, l a r g e l y  those  who were reass igned  t o  f u n c t i o n a l  
organiza t ions ,  s t a t e d  they  a r e  d i s s a t i s f i e d  wi th  t h e i r  new p o s i t i o n s .  
Also,  i n  a p r o j e c t  o f f i c e  t ime i s  one of t h e  most important f a c t o r s .  
"It (program o f f i c e  experience)  makes one d i s s a t i s f i e d  as program o f f i c e  
work i s  usua l ly  a t  a f a s t e r  pace and of more urgency than  most o t h e r  
d i r e c t o r a t e s .  'I 
However, perhaps t h e  following comment expresses  f a i r l y  a c c u r a t e l y  
t h e  gene ra l  f e e l i n g  of t h e  personnel  of  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  towards 
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t h e i r  experience:  
success fu l  program." 
"There can be no b e t t e r  t r a i n i n g  than  t o  work on a 
There i s  no ques t ion  bu t  t h a t  Gemini w a s  a s u c c e s s f u l  program and 
t h a t  t h e  people who worked i n  t h e  Program Of f i ce  were a h ighly  s k i l l e d ,  
t a l e n t e d ,  and c l o s e l y  k n i t  work fo rce .  I n  view of t h e s e  f a c t s ,  how d i d  
t h e s e  employees f e e l  about breaking up t h i s  "teamt1? To o b t a i n  t h i s  in- 
formation w e  asked them i f  they  f e l t  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  "team" 
should have been kept  t oge the r  as a group f o r  f u t u r e  p r o j e c t s .  
26.1 percent  expressed t h e  opinion t h a t  t h e  group should have been 
he ld  t o g e t h e r ,  8.0 percent  f e l t  t h i s  had gene ra l ly  been done e s p e c i a l l y  
i n  t h e  case  of t h e  Apollo Appl ica t ions  Program Of f i ce ,  and 4 . 5  percent  
s a i d  they  had no opinion.  
There were a number of reasons given f o r  t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of keep- 
ing t h e  team toge the r .  
it has worked toge the r  f o r  some pe r iod  of t ime.  It was s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  
Gemini team knew how t o  accomplish any job  t h a t  w a s  g iven t o  it. Work- 
ing  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  had taken  cons iderable  t i m e .  
Because t h e s e  were destroyed by t h e  t r a n s f e r  of personnel ,  new r e l a t i o n -  
sh ips  w i l l  have t o  be developed which w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  a l o s s  of t h e  
agency's resources .  I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  each person knew exac t ly  t h e  ex- 
t e n t  and l i m i t a t i o n s  of  h i s  job r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  c a r e e r  enhancement. 
It w a s  a success fu l  team and most of t h e  people  knew t h e  s t rong  as w e l l  
as t h e  weak po in t s  of t h e  personnel .  A s  a group, coord ina t ion ,  know- 
ledge  and experience were of t h e  h ighes t  l e v e l .  
Some f e l t  t h a t  a group i s  more e f f e c t i v e  a f te r  
However, it w a s  somewhat s u r p r i s i n g  t o  d iscover  t h a t  i n  s p i t e  of 
t h e  f a c t  an e s p r i t  de corps had e x i s t e d  t o  such a h igh  degree among 
t h e s e  people ,  61.4 percent  of t h e  88 who answered t h i s  ques t ion  f e l t  
t h a t  t h e  team should not have been kept t o g e t h e r .  Within t h i s  group of 
respondents were some from every occupat ion and d i v i s i o n  i n  t h e  Program 
Off ice .  Thus, it was not j u s t  a p a r t i c u l a r  work group o r  t ype  of em- 
ployee who expressed t h i s  same opinion.  They f e l t  t h a t  r eas s ign ing  them 
t o  o t h e r  o rgan iza t iona l  elements w i th in  MSC w a s  i n  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  of 
bo th  MSC and t h e  ind iv idua l s  involved. Many of  t h e  opinions expressed 
appear t o  be t h e  oppos i te  of  t hose  reasons given f o r  keeping t h e  team 
t o g e t h e r .  
Why d id  such a l a r g e  number of t h e s e  employees f ee l  it w a s  i n  t h e i r  
b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  t o  have t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  team broken up? One 
answer t o  t h i s  ques t ion  provides  a good summary of most of t h e  reasons 
f o r  t h i s  opinion: 
A s  an organiza t ion  ages ,  it becomes somewhat i n f l e x i b l e  i n  i t s  
approach t o  new problems. "The way w e  d i d  it on Gemini" i s  not  
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n e c e s s a r i l y  t h e  b e s t  way on a new prograii.  
more by making experienced program management personnel  ava i l -  
able t o  o t h e r  elements of MSC and o t h e r  Centers .  A s i g n i f i c a n t  
c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  t h e  e f f ec t iveness  of t h e  "Gemini team" w a s  t h e  
more o r  less  personal  working r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a t t a i n e d  with Gemini 
con t r ac to r s .  In  o the r  words, no o t h e r  p r o j e c t s  would have "f i t"  
t h e  Gemini organiza t ion .  
XSA- s i l l  hefiefit. 
It w a s  f e l t  t h a t  i n  t h e  long run ,  t h e  l o s s  of  con t inu i ty  and e f f i c -  
iency r e s u l t i n g  from breaking up t h e  Gemini group would be outweighed by 
b e n e f i c i a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  program o f f i c e  experience t o  o t h e r  MSC elements 
It w a s  a l s o  f e l t  t h a t  keeping t h e  team t o g e t h e r  would be u n f a i r  t o  i nd i -  
v idua l s  seeking c a r e e r  advancement f o r  t hey  should have t h e  oppor tuni ty  
t o  ga in  broader  types  of experience.  Teams t e n d  t o  s t a g n a t e ,  t o  do 
t h i n g s  t h e  same way and r e s i s t  new ideas  o r  new procedures .  From t h e  
s tandpoin t  of personnel  mot iva t ion ,  t h e  change w a s  b e n e f i c i a l  i n  t h a t  
it prevented p o t e n t i a l  l axness  due t o  f a m i l i a r i t y .  
Gemini team i n t o  t h e  o the r  C e n t e r  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  enhance t h e  cohesiveness 
of t h e  manned space f l i g h t  programs. 
The melding of t h e  
Would t h e  disbanding of  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
reassignment of i t s  personnel  c r e a t e  a loss of con t inu i ty  and e f f i c i e n c y  
i n  t h e  p roduc t iv i ty  of t h e s e  employees? We asked them how long they  es- 
t imated  it w i l l  t a k e  t o  f u l l y  acquaint  themselves wi th  t h e i r  new work 
and organiza t ions .  O f  t h e  83 responses ,  30.1 percent  s a i d  they  were al- 
ready familiar wi th  t h e i r  new jobs  and o rgan iza t ions  o r  would be i n  a 
very s h o r t  t ime. 
e f f e c t i v e  wi th in  t h r e e  months, whi le  31.3 percent  s a i d  it would t a k e  from 
t h r e e  t o  s i x  months t o  become f u l l y  acquainted.  
it would t a k e  longer  than  s i x  months. 
An a d d i t i o n a l  32.6 percent  s t a t e d  they  would be f u l l y  
Only 6.0 percent  f e l t  
We a l s o  asked whether t h e i r  new p o s i t i o n s  r equ i r ed  any s p e c i a l  re- 
t r a i n i n g  and, if so ,  how w a s  it being conducted. 
t h i s  ques t ion  76.3 percent  claimed t h a t  no s p e c i a l  r e t r a i n i n g  was re- 
qui red .  
w a s  necessary and w a s  being conducted i n  t e c h n i c a l  c l a s s e s  given by t h e i r  
new o rgan iza t ions  o r  by t h e  con t r ac to r s .  The remaining 6.5 percent  stat-  
ed t h a t  r e t r a i n i n g  w a s  requi red ,  bu t  d i d  not  i n d i c a t e  how t h i s  w a s  being 
handled. 
O f  t h e  93 who answered 
There w a s  another  17.2 percent  who s a i d  t h a t  s p e c i a l  r e t r a i n i n g  
A t  t h e  conclusion of the  ques t ionna i r e  t h e  employees were asked t o  
g ive  suggest ions f o r  improving t h e  procedures  which were used and f o r  
a d d i t i o n a l  comments they  may have about t h e  phase out  of t h e  Gemini Pro- 
gram Off ice .  
comments and an a d d i t i o n a l  1 6  respondents  who s t a t e d  they  f e l t  none were 
necessary.  
t i o n s  t o  t h e  phase o u t ,  were c r i t i c a l  of a number of t h e  procedures.  
Thei r  sugges t ions  followed qu i t e  c l o s e l y  t h e  ones expressed by t h o s e  
r e spons ib l e  f o r  implementing t h e  procedures .  
O f  t h e  1 0 1  ques t ionnai res  r e tu rned  t h e r e  were 1 5  wi th  no 
The remaining 70, whi le  g e n e r a l l y  favorable  i n  t h e i r  reac-  
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A s  ind ica ted  earlier,  one of t h e  most f requent  ob jec t ions  concerned 
t h e  l a c k  of an o f f i c i a l  source of information.  They f e l t  t h a t  t h e  at- 
tempt a t  secrecy should have been avoided: 
enough t o  assume t h a t  h i s  present  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w i l l  be  p rope r ly  d i s -  
charged while f u t u r e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  are explored."  
"Respect t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
A r ecu r r ing  complaint involved what w a s  considered t o  be poor com- 
munications throughout t h e  Center.  It w a s  s t a t e d  t h a t  f i r s t  and second 
l i n e  superv isors  i n  o the r  o rgan iza t iona l  elements e i t h e r  had never seen 
a r e l e a s e  l i s t  or saw them af te r  an ind iv idua l  had been reass igned .  (I t  
w i l l  be  remembered t h a t  t h e  release l i s t s  followed t h e  formal communica- 
t i o n  networks o f  t h e  Center . )  A s  a r e s u l t ,  some employees r epor t ed  hav- 
ing  been contacted about good p o s i t i o n s  a month o r  more a f t e r  t hey  ac- 
cepted another o f f e r  simply because it w a s  not known e a r l i e r  t h a t  they  
were ava i l ab le .  "Too many in te rv iews  were conducted where t h e  i n t e r -  
viewer obviously knew nothing of a man's background." 
w a s  made t h a t  t o o  many in te rv iews  were experienced where t h e  in te rv iewer  
had no s p e c i f i c  p o s i t i o n  i n  mind which r e s u l t e d  i n  a good d e a l  of wasted 
t i m e  . 
Another p o i n t  
The consensus on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  employees appeared t o  be  t h a t  
everyone should have been n o t i f i e d  a t  t h e  same t i m e  concerning what 
p l ans  were being made f o r  t h e  phase ou t .  Pe r iod ic  b r i e f i n g s  should 
have been held t o  keep them informed of t h e  progress  t o  prevent  t h e  
spread of  unfounded and o f t e n  inaccura t e  rumors. 
have been given t h e  f i r s t  oppor tuni ty  f o r  p o s i t i o n s  r a t h e r  t han  being 
t h e  las t  people placed.  
The key people should 
Fur the r ,  it was suggested t h a t  t h e  employees should have been al- 
lowed t o  wr i t e  a s h o r t  d e s c r i p t i o n  of what t ypes  of work and/or  organi-  
za t ions  they  would l i k e .  This  could then  have been a t tached  t o  t h e i r  
resumes, which should have included more than  t h e i r  Gemini experience,  
and d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  a l l  t h e  Div is ion  Chiefs .  Also ,  if t h e  spaces  had gone 
wi th  t h e  people placement would have been much e a s i e r  i n  many cases .  
Because they  a l l  knew Gemini w a s  scheduled t o  end i n  t h e  near  fu- 
t u r e ,  t hey  f e l t  t h a t  arrangements could have begun much sooner than  they  
d id .  
t h e  Gemini Program Office u n t i l  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  were completed. 
If any unforeseen circumstances had arisen which r equ i r ed  t h e i r  a t t en -  
t i o n  a f te r  t h e i r  t r a n s f e r ,  they  could have been d e t a i l e d  back t o  handle  
it. This  would have taken  ca re  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  many s a i d  e x i s t e d  
where people  were he ld  i n  t h e  Program Of f i ce  a f t e r  t h e i r  work was es- 
s e n t i a l l y  completed. 
Reassignments could have been made wi th  t h e  people remaining i n  
I n  genera l ,  t h e  f e e l i n g  of many of t h e  employees appears t o  be t h a t  
t h e  e s t ab l i shed  p o l i c i e s  and procedures  were b a s i c a l l y  sound, bu t  not 
everyone involved followed t h e  ground r u l e s  thereby  des t roying  i n  a nun- 
ber of  ways the  o v e r a l l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECO-WENDATIONS 
The o r i g i n a l  t ru i sm s t a t e d  at t h e  beginning of t h i s  s tudy w a s  t h a t  
an organiza t ion  which i s  s t r u c t u r e d  on t h e  basis of i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  pro- 
grams w i l l  f a c e  an extremely complex problem i n  dea l ing  wi th  t h e  a l loca-  
t i o n  of i t s  personnel .  This w i l l  be e s p e c i a l l y  t r u e  when those  programs 
a r e  sub jec t  t o  con t inua l  change and t h e  completion of one program over- 
l a p s  or i s  t o  be followed by t h e  i n i t i a t i o n  of a new one. A s  we have 
seen i n  t h e  preceding chapters ,  t h e r e  i s  no simple so lu t ion  t o  t h e  per- 
sonnel  problems c rea t ed  by the  in t roduc t ion  of  program management and 
t h e  program o f f i c e  concept i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  func t iona l  o rgan iza t iona l  
s t r u c t u r e .  
A t  b e s t ,  t h e  phase out of a program o f f i c e  would be expected t o  
proceed wi th in  a somewhat negat ive environment. 
ees  themselves,  working i n  a program o f f i c e  has a s p e c i a l  p r e s t i g e  at- 
tached  t o  it. They form a c lose ly  k n i t  group, are gene ra l ly  given spec- 
i a l  cons idera t ion  by management, and have d u t i e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of  
a broader na tu re  than  i s  found i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  func t iona l  l i n e  organiza- 
t i o n s .  
g e t  i n t o  t h e  program o f f  ice" .  
According t o  t h e  employ- 
A s  w a s  revea led  e a r l i e r  i n  our d i scuss ion ,  "everyone wants t o  
I n  view of t h e s e  a t t i t u d e s ,  s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  must be given t o  t h e  
manner i n  which t h e  phase out  of any program o f f i c e  i s  handled. While 
t h e r e  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  be some employees who a r e  d i s s a t i s f i e d ,  t h e  objec- 
t i v e  of any procedures must be t o  l i m i t  t h e  amount of d i scontent  as much 
as i s  poss ib l e .  It i s  not easy f o r  an employee t o  be f r equen t ly  uprooted 
from h i s  p o s i t i o n  and reassigned t o  a new area. It i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  d i f -  
f i c u l t  when he i s  t r a n s f e r r e d ,  not i n t o  a newly i n i t i a t e d  program, bu t  
i n t o  one t h a t  has been i n  progress  f o r  some t ime where r e l a t i o n s h i p s  have 
a l ready  been formed and du t i e s  long s i n c e  assigned.  A s  t h e  quest ion-  * 
n a i r e s  ind ica t ed ,  it usua l ly  t akes  s e v e r a l  months or more before  he can 
become f u l l y  e f f e c t i v e  again which can, as o f t en  as no t ,  c r e a t e  personal  
f e e l i n g s  of f r u s t r a t i o n .  The need for cons tan t  r e t r a i n i n g  can undermine 
h i s  own sense of s e c u r i t y  and se l fconf idence .  
of a program o f f i c e  i n t o  a func t iona l  l i n e  organiza t ion  where he f e e l s  
h i s  d u t i e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  have been diminished, it can prove t o  be 
a d i f f i c u l t  adjustment f o r  him t o  have t o  make. This reduct ion  i n  t h e  
scope of t h e i r  d u t i e s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  w a s  f r equen t ly  mentioned by 
t h e  employees who were phased out  of  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice .  
I f  he i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  out  
A l l  of t h e s e  a spec t s  should be taken i n t o  cons idera t ion  when p lans  
a r e  being made by management t o  phase out  a program o f f i ce .  
cedures a r e  c e r t a i n l y  d i f f i c u l t ,  bu t  without s p e c i a l  a t t e n t i o n  given t o  
The pro- 
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t h e  employees they  wish t o  r e t a i n ,  an un fo r tuna te  s i t u a t i o n  can only  be 
made worse. It goes without saying t h a t  t h e  primary concern of  manage- 
ment must be f o r  what i s  i n  t h e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t  of t h e  o rgan iza t ion .  How- 
ever, wi th in  these  l i m i t s ,  s p e c i a l  cons idera t ion  can and should be g iven  
t o  t h e  employees whose ca ree r s  w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  by t h e s e  dec i s ions .  
What can be l ea rned  from t h e  Nat ional  Aeronaut ics  and Space Admin- 
i s t r a t i o n ' s  Manned Spacecraf t  Center experience wi th  i t s  problems emana- 
t i n g  from t h i s  type  of organiza t ion  and t h e  procedures  which have been 
developed f o r  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  of t h e  a f f e c t e d  personnel?  
procedures  which were used have been examined, are t h e r e  any sugges t ions  
which can be of fe red  t o  improve them? Can w e  assume t h a t  t h e  procedures  
used i n  t h e  pas t  w i l l  be app l i cab le  t o  any phase out  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e  o r  i s  t h e  environment i n  which t h e  t e rmina t ion  of  a program occurs  
t h e  determining f a c t o r ?  Using p a s t  experience t o g e t h e r  w i th  sugges t ions  
f o r  i t s  improvement i s  it p o s s i b l e  t o  develop a s e t  of procedures  which 
can be used i n  t h e  f u t u r e  o r  are f l e x i b l e  gu ide l ines  adaptab le  t o  e x i s t -  
ing  condi t ions  t h e  only reasonable  a l t e r n a t i v e ?  
Now t h a t  t h e  
In  an attempt t o  provide some answers t o  t h e s e  ques t ions  t h e  Manned 
Spacecraf t  C e n t e r ' s  experience wi th  t h e  phase out  of t h e  Mercury P r o j e c t  
Of f i ce  and t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce ,  bo th  a t  t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Cen- 
t e r  i n  Houston and at NASA Headquarters i n  Washington, should be reviewed 
and compared on a number of' p o i n t s .  
The Mercury P ro jec t  Of f i ce  team had been he ld  toge the r  i n  an t i c ipa -  
t i o n  of t h e  scheduling of two a d d i t i o n a l  f l i g h t s .  A t  t h a t  t i m e  t h e r e  
were only 50 employees i n  t h e  P r o j e c t  Off ice .  A t  t h e  same t i m e  t h e r e  
were 285 vacancies i n  t h e  Center ,  t h e  Gemini and Apollo programs were 
expanding, and Congressional support  and money were not  l ack ing .  Be- 
cause of t hese  f a c t o r s  t h e r e  w a s  no problem concerning a t i m e  phased 
p l a n  f o r  r e l eas ing  t h e  employees, no ques t ions  regard ing  t h e  merits of 
keeping t h e  adminis t ra t ive  a c t i v i t i e s  s t r i c t l y  c o n f i d e n t i a l  had t o  be 
r a i s e d ,  and the  s m a l l  s i z e  of t h e  group r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  number of vacan- 
c i e s  i n  t h e  Center minimized t h e  placement problem. Therefore ,  it w a s  
p r i m a r i l y  t h e  condi t ions  e x i s t i n g  o u t s i d e  t h e  P r o j e c t  Of f i ce  i t s e l f  which 
determined how t h e  phase out  would be handled. 
However, none of t h e s e  favorable  condi t ions  e x i s t e d  a t  t h e  t ime 
p repa ra t ions  for t h e  phase out  of t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  began. 
a r e s u l t ,  a more  s t r u c t u r e d  process  had t o  be developed t o  handle  t h e  
reassignment of t h e  a f f e c t e d  personnel .  There w a s  no unexpected ending 
t o  t h i s  program. It w a s  unique i n  t h a t  a s p e c i f i c  number of  f l i g h t s  
w a s  announced s e v e r a l  y e a r s  i n  advance. It r e p r e s e n t s  one of t h e  few 
R&D programs t o  da t e  which have ended i n  t h a t  fashion.  The number of 
personnel  i n  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice  a t  t h e  t ime t h e  phase out  began 
w a s  185, t o o  l a r g e  a group t o  be absorbed i n t o  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  at one 
A s  
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while  t h e  Apollo Applicat ions Program Off ice  w a s  i n  i t s  i n i t i a l  s t ages  
of development, t h e  Apollo Spacecraf t  Off ice  had been i n  ex i s t ence  s i n c e  
1961. These environmental condi t ions s t rong ly  inf luenced  t h e  dec i s ions  
which were made by management regarding t h e  procedures which were made 
by management regarding t h e  procedures which were t o  be followed i n  t h e  
phase out .  
By way of  a summary w e  can l i s t  some of  t h e s e  dec is ions  which were 
made without a f u r t h e r  explanat ion of t h e  reasons f o r  them as they  have 
a l ready  been discussed i n  Chapter V. 
It w a s  decided f i r s t  o f  a l l  t h a t  t h e  phase out  a c t i v i t i e s  should be 
conducted i n  s t r i c t  confidence. From t h e  in te rv iews  wi th  management and 
t h e  response from t h e  employees t h i s  attempt a t  secrecy cannot be con- 
s ide red  t o  have been completely successfu l .  A s  was poin ted  out i n  Chap- 
t e r s  V I  and V I I ,  it c rea t ed  even more problems than  would have otherwise 
been t h e  case.  I n  add i t ion  t o  causing a d d i t i o n a l  concern on t h e  p a r t  of 
employees, much of  it based on unfounded and unt rue  rumors, t h e  responses 
t o  t h e  ques t ionnai res  would tend t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  it alsa r e s u l t e d  i n  
f e e l i n g s  of resentment towards management f o r  not having t o l d  them any- 
t h i n g  except "not t o  worry". 
This attempt a t  secrecy l e d  t o  t h e  necess i ty  f o r  preparing t h e  t h r e e  
sepa ra t e  r e l e a s e  l i s ts  t h e  disadvantages of which have a l ready  been dis- 
cussed. The r e s u l t s  of  t h i s  procedure proved t o  be q u i t e  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  
as it produced a f e a r  on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  employees t h a t  not a l l  of them 
would have an equal opportuni ty  f o r  what they considered t o  be t h e  be t -  
t e r  p o s i t i o n s .  The Program Manager i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  , i n  r e t r o s p e c t  , t h i s  
i s  one t h i n g  he would have done d i f f e r e n t l y .  26 
The Program Manager's f e a r  t h a t  i f  t h e  employees were t o l d  everyone 
would be out  seeking new pos i t i ons  on t h e i r  own appears t o  have been un- 
founded. While only seven out of  t h e  97 respondents claimed they  d i d  
not know t h a t  t h e  reassignment of personnel  had begun p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  of-  
f i c i a l  n o t i f i c a t i o n  of r e l e a s e  f o r  i n t e rv i ew,  91.2 percent  s t a t e d  they  
followed h i s  i n s t r u c t i o n  and made no con tac t s  on t h e i r  own beha l f .  Sure- 
l y  t h i s  would have a l so  been t h e  case i f  they  had been o f f i c i a l l y  b r i e f e d  
as thoroughly as poss ib l e  on what ac t ions  were being t aken  on t h e i r  be- 
h a l f .  I n  f a c t ,  one could poss ib ly  conclude t h a t  t h i s  f i g u r e  might even 
have been h igher  if more of t he  doubts about t h e i r  f u t u r e  could have been 
removed and they  had known management was tak ing  such ex tens ive  precau- 
t i o n s  t o  f i n d  comparable pos i t i ons  f o r  them. 
It w a s  t h i s  approach t h a t  w a s  used by t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  a t  
NASA Headquarters and i s  one which they  f e e l  worked very success fu l ly  
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f o r  them. Once t h e  i n i t i a l  dec i s ions  were made by Headquarters manage- 
ment as t o  t h e  cons ide ra t ions  t h a t  had t o  be taken  i n t o  account i n  phas- 
ing  out  t h e  Program Of f i ce ,  t h e  employees were n o t i f i e d  regard ing  what 
p l a n s  were being put  i n t o  ope ra t ion .  
formed as t o  what progress  w a s  being made. There had been some unfavor- 
able r e s u l t s  i n  t h e  p a s t  from t r y i n g  t o  keep personnel. a c t i o n s  such as 
t h i s  s t r i c t l y  c o n f i d e n t i a l  and management f e l t  t h a t  t h i s  method w a s  t h e  
b e s t  way t o  avoid t o  a l a r g e  ex ten t  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  d i s sens ion .  
They were kept  p e r i o d i c a l l y  in -  
One c r i t i c i s m  of t h e  p o l i c i e s  and procedures  of t h e  phase out  of 
A t  
t h e  Gemini Program Office a t  MSC t h a t  w a s  heard f r equen t ly  w a s  t h a t  
p repa ra t ions  should have been s t a r t e d  much sooner than  they  were. 
NASA Headquarters,  with only 50 employees i n  t h e  Program Of f i ce  who 
would need t o  be reass igned  and wi th  t h e  g r e a t  demand f o r  t h e s e  people 
i n  o t h e r  areas, p repa ra t ions  began f o r  phasing out  t h e  Of f i ce  as e a r l y  
as January 1966. 
t o  be reassigned and t h e  more d i f f i c u l t  condi t ions  which e x i s t e d ,  prep- 
a r a t i o n s  were not  begun u n t i l  June 1966. A t  Headquarters a l l  of t h e  re- 
assignments were completed and a l l  of t h e  necessary paper work processed 
(wi th  t h e  exception of f i l l i n g  i n  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  d a t e  of t r a n s f e r )  as 
e a r l y  as J u l y .  This  w a s  i n  s p i t e  of t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  bulk  of t h e  em- 
ployees would not a c t u a l l y  be r e l eased  u n t i l  December. When t h e  quest ion-  
n a i r e s  d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  employees a t  t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center were 
r e tu rned  i n  l a t e  February 1967, it w a s  discovered t h a t  two of t h e  respond- 
e n t s  s t a t e d  they s t i l l  had not been f u l l y  ass igned t o  new p o s i t i o n s  as of 
t h a t  t i m e .  These f a c t s  would appear t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  by beginning t h e  
planning and arranging f o r  t h e  forthcoming reassignments e a r l i e r  t han  had 
been t h e  case  some of these bo t t l enecks  could have been e l imina ted .  
A t  t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center ,  w i th  185 employees 
Another problem appeared which deserves  some a t t e n t i o n .  The concept 
of t h e  Adminis t ra t ive Committee t o  coord ina te  t h e  procedures  rece ived  en- 
dorsement from both  management and t h e  employees. However, it appears 
t h a t  somewhere i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t h i s  c a r e f u l l y  planned system f a i l e d  
t o  ope ra t e  as a n t i c i p a t e d .  From t h e  in te rv iews  and t h e  employee quest ion-  
n a i r e s  numerous complaints were voiced,  bu t  it w a s  not p o s s i b l e  t o  de te r -  
mine exac t ly  where t h e  weaknesses i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  were loca ted .  
The members o f  t h e  Adminis t ra t ive Committee s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  informa- 
t i o n  furn ished  on t h e  a v a i l a b l e  employees w a s  adequate ,  b u t  because of 
t h e  form i n  which it w a s  p resented  it w a s  inconvenient t o  u t i l i z e .  This  
information was t o  be d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  Div is ion  Chiefs  of  t h e  organi- 
za t ions  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  Gemini employees. However, from many of t h e  ques- 
t i o n n a i r e s ,  as we have seen ,  a very f requent  comment w a s  t h a t  when an 
employee a r r ived  f o r  h i s  i n t e rv i ew t h e  in te rv iewer  knew l i t t l e  o r  noth- 
ing  about h i s  background and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and o f t en  had only a l i s t  
where h i s  name appeared. This  meant t h a t  t i m e  w a s  wasted i n  t h e s e  i n t e r -  
views, a s i t u a t i o n  which could have been avoided had t h e  necessary  in fo r -  
mation been made a v a i l a b l e  beforehand. 
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The List of  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  
Committee. Yet , 
Gemini employees scheduled f o r  r e l e a s e  w a s  t o  be made 
Divis ion Chiefs by t h e  members of t h e  Adminis t ra t ive 
a number of employees s t a t e d  on t h e  ques t ionna i r e s  t h a t  
t .here were mmy imta?x6x where f i r s t  &?d second l i n e  superv isors  who 
were i n t e r e s t e d  i n  them d i d  not f i n d  out  u n t i l  q u i t e  some time l a t e r  t h a t  
they were a v a i l a b l e .  I n  a number of cases  contac ts  such as t h e s e  were 
not made u n t i l  a f t e r  an employee had decided t o  accept another  p o s i t i o n .  
Exactly where t h e  communications network broke down i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
determine. However , perhaps t h i s  unfor tuna te  s i t u a t i o n  would not have 
occurred i f  t h e  attempt a t  secrecy had been avoided and t h e  d e s i r e d  in-  
formation w a s  openly and r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  
It w a s  suggested by seve ra l  of t hose  who were interviewed and w a s  
f r equen t ly  mentioned by t h e  employees t h a t  t h e  personnel  spaces should 
have gone wi th  t h e  employees. They f e l t  t h i s  would have eased t h e  place-  
ment problems somewhat. However, management had reass igned  t h e  personnel  
c e i l i n g s  t o  those  organiza t ions  which needed a d d i t i o n a l  personnel .  
suggest ion would have perhaps eased t h e  placement problem, but  a l s o  would 
have r e s u l t e d  i n  bui ld ing  up organiza t ions  which might a l ready be t o o  
l a r g e .  
This  
A s  we d iscussed ,  t h e r e  were v a l i d  reasons behind a l l  of t h e  deci-  
s ions  which were made regarding t h e  methods which would be used. F i r s t  
and foremost w a s  t h e  Program Manager's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  Gemini 
Program. He had t o  be concerned wi th  keeping t h e  complete a t t e n t i o n  of 
h i s  people on t h a t  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  He could not a f f o r d  t o  have them 
th ink ing  i n s t e a d  about t h e i r  next j obs .  However, it should be noted 
t h a t  t h o s e  who were interviewed at NASA Headquarters f e l t  t h a t  i n  t h e i r  
case t h i s  i n  no way proved t o  be a problem. 
The Program Manager i s  well-known throughout t h e  Center as a man 
who i s  very l o y a l  t o  those  who work f o r  him. 
phase out h i s  concern was t h a t  t h e s e  people be p laced  i n  what he con- 
s ide red  t o  be  t h e  r i g h t  p o s i t i o n s .  He pe r sona l ly  be l i eved  t h a t  t h e r e  
were employees who had not been taken  ca re  of proper ly  when t h e  Mercury 
P ro jec t  Of f i ce  w a s  phased out and he d i d  not want t h e  same t h i n g  t o  hap- 
pen t o  any of h i s  people.  
haps I w a s  over ly  concerned with t h i s  a spec t .  
Throughout t h e  e n t i r e  
However, as he s t a t e d  i n  r e t r o s p e c t :  "Per- 
if27 
But,  if t h e  Program Manager w a s  noted for being l o y a l  t o  h i s  people ,  
it should a l s o  be s t r e s s e d  t h a t  h i s  people a r e  known f o r  being l o y a l  t o  
him. This  f e e l i n g  of l o y a l t y  and t h e  esprit de corps o f  t h e  Gemini Pro- 
gram Office w a s  perhaps underestimated when t h e  dec is ions  about t h e  phase 
out procedures were being made. This  may be why more than  91 percent  of 
t h e  respondents s t a t e d  they  had made no con tac t s  f o r  p o s i t i o n s  on t h e i r  
own behalf  as he had requested.  The evidence would appear t o  i n d i c a t e  
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t h a t  when he t o l d  them they  would r ece ive  comparable p o s i t i o n s  w i t h i n  
t h e  Center they be l ieved  it. They only asked t o  be r e spec ted  as ind i -  
v idua l s  who knew enough t o  concent ra te  on t h e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  at hand 
and, regard less  of t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  would cont inue t o  do t h e  e x c e l l e n t  
job  they  had done throughout t h e  l i f e  of  t h e  Gemini Program. 
I n  concluding t h e  d iscuss ion  of  t h e  NASA-Manned Spacecraf t  Cen te r ' s  
experience with t h e  phase out  of i t s  program o f f i c e s  we can say t h a t ,  i n  
view of t h e  uniqueness of t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  p o l i c i e s  and procedures  
which were developed were b a s i c a l l y  sound. However, cons ider ing  t h e  
c r i t i c i s m s  of fered  by both management and t h e  employees it i s  apparent  
t h a t  t h e  mechanisms f o r  handling t h e  reassignments which have been d is -  
cussed above should be modified i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  None of t h e s e  suggested 
changes would r e q u i r e  any s i g n i f i c a n t  adjustment i n  t h e  approach. The 
results of t h e  methods as presented  i n  Chapter V speak f o r  themselves.  
A t  t h i s  po in t  w e  must look b r i e f l y  t o  t h e  f u t u r e .  The Gemini Pro- 
gram Of f i ce  has only r ecen t ly  been removed from t h e  o f f i c i a l  Manned 
Spacecraf t  Center organiza t ion  c h a r t .  Already one f r equen t ly  h e a r s ,  
"When Apollo phases ou t .  . . " 
What w i l l  happen when t h e  Apollo Spacecraf t  Program Of f i ce  phases 
ou t?  It i s  un l ike ly  t h a t  t h e  same procedures which were used f o r  Gemini 
w i l l  exac t ly  f i t  t h e  phase out of o the r  program o f f i c e s .  A s  we have 
shown, t h e  dec is ions  t h a t  w i l l  need t o  be made w i l l  be inf luenced  l a r g e l y  
by t h e  environmental condi t ions  e x i s t i n g  a t  t h e  t ime such a phase out  
t a k e s  p l a c e  as w e l l  as t h e  na tu re  of NASA's f u t u r e  programs. There are 
l i k e l y  t o  be d i f f e r e n t  people respons ib le  f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  p o l i c i e s  
and procedures who may wish t o  approach it using a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
philosophy. 
I n  any case ,  those  who w i l l  u l t i m a t e l y  be r e spons ib l e  f o r  phasing 
out  t h e  Apollo o f f i c e  a r e  not t o  be envied.  One reason Mercury w a s  no 
g r e a t e r  problem than  it w a s  can be a t t r i b u t e d  l a r g e l y  t o  i t s  s m a l l  s i z e .  
The phase out of  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  at  NASA Headquarters w a s  a l s o  
s a i d  t o  have proceeded r e l a t i v e l y  smoothly because of t h e  s m a l l  number 
of employees involved. Those who were interviewed r e a d i l y  admit ted they  
d i d  not  know how w e l l  t h e i r  procedures  would have worked or how they  
would have handled it i f  t h e r e  had been a l a r g e r  group t o  be p laced .  
Phasing out  t h e  Gemini Program Of f i ce  at t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center 
w a s  v a s t l y  more complicated by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  were 185 employees 
t o  be reassigned.  
Up t o  t h i s  po in t  t h e  Apollo Appl ica t ions  Program Office has  attempt- 
ed t o  maintain a r e l a t i v e l y  s m a l l  number of  employees. 
cont inue t o  expand, as of  March 1967 t h e r e  were only 7 1  employees as- 
s igned  t o  t h i s  Off ice .  
Although it w i l l  
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However, as of March 1967 t h e  t o t a l  number of  employees on board 
29 and committed i n  t h e  Apollo Spacecraf t  Program Off ice  had reached 393. 
As a r e su l t ,  t h e r e  w i l l  have t o  be some very ca re fu l  and thorough p l m -  
ning i n  o rde r  t o  r eas s ign  t h i s  l a r g e  group of  employees t o  p o s i t i o n s  
Within t h e  Center when t h e  Apollo Program i s  completed. The h ighe r  
grade leve l  s t r u c t u r e ,  which w a s  found t o  be q u i t e  a problem i n  phasing 
out  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice ,  a l s o  e x i s t s  i n  t h i s  Off ice .  If t h i s  
t r e n d  cont inues ,  t h e  problems which it c r e a t e s  w i l l  cont inue t o  grow as 
wel l .  
However, t h e  numbers o f  personnel  involved does not r ep resen t  t h e  
e n t i r e  problem t h a t  w i l l  have t o  be m e t .  
becoming more complex and t h i s  t r e n d  w i l l  c e r t a i n l y  cont inue.  
programs become more complex they  w i l l  r e q u i r e  even more h ighly  s k i l l e d  
personnel .  A s  w e  d i scussed  i n  Chapter 11, t h e  more p r o f e s s i o n a l  t h e  em- 
p loyees ,  t h e  less app l i cab le  are t h e  management techniques  found i n  a 
simple superior-subordinate  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  I t  i s  doubt fu l  t h a t  t h e s e  
h ighly  t r a i n e d  p r o f e s s i o n a l s  w i l l  be w i l l i n g  t o  w a i t  f o r  a c t i o n  on t h e  
part of  management when dec is ions  about t h e i r  ca ree r s  a r e  being made. 
I n  t h e  case  of  t h e  Gemini phase out  t h i s  problem w a s  not as severe  as 
it might have been p r imar i ly  because t h e r e  were o the r  program o f f i c e s  
a l r eady  i n  ex i s t ence ;  i . e . ,  t h e  Apollo Spacecraf t  Program Of f i ce  and 
t h e  Apollo Appl ica t ions  Program Of f i ce ,  which both had p o s i t i o n s  ava i l -  
ab le .  If t h i s  had not been t h e  case  t h e r e  undoubtedly would have been 
a much g r e a t e r  percentage o f  employees seeking p o s i t i o n s  on t h e i r  own. 
The programs themselves are 
A s  t h e  
The p o i n t  t h a t  must be made here  i s  t h a t  t h e  exac t  procedures used 
The comments and sugges- 
i n  phasing out  t h e  Gemini Program Off ice  w i l l  no doubt prove t o  be un- 
workable f o r  Apollo or o t h e r  f u t u r e  programs. 
t i o n s  made by those  who developed and implemented t h e  procedures  as w e l l  
as t h e  r e a c t i o n s  of t h o s e  who were a f f e c t e d  by them should not be ignored 
It i s  not t o o  e a r l y  t o  begin a cons idera t ion  of t h e  p o s s i b l e  procedures  
which can be developed t o  b e s t  meet t h e  problems which w i l l  be encoun- 
t e r e d  when Apollo i s  phased ou t .  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  f irst  s t e p  which should be taken  i n  any f u t u r e  
phase out  would be a determinat ion of t h e  manpower a v a i l a b l e  a t  t h a t  
t i m e  t oge the r  wi th  a determinat ion of t h e  f u t u r e  manpower needs i n s o f a r  
as t h i s  i s  poss ib l e .  
i n  a government agency where f u t u r e  programs depend on congress iona l  
a c t i o n .  
This l a t t e r  s t e p  i s  not always e a s i l y  accomplished 
Secondly, t h e  t ime phasing of t h e  program phase down must be estab-  
l i s h e d .  Because of  t h e  d e f i n i t e  end p o i n t  inherent  i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  
program, t h i s  can gene ra l ly  be a n t i c i p a t e d  wi th in  reasonable  l i m i t s  as 
was shown w i t h  Gemini. 
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Another i n i t i a l  dec is ion  t h a t  must be made concerns t h e  ques t ion  
of who should p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of management's dec i s ions  
regard ing  phase out procedures.  
e s t a b l i s h e d  fo r  Gemini w a s  composed of  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from a l l  t h e  pro- 
gram o f f i c e s  and o rgan iza t iona l  elements w i th in  MSC. 
composition i s  perhaps b e s t  equipped t o  develop t h e  necessary overview 
of  t h e  condi t ions  which e x i s t  throughout t h e  Center.  
The Adminis t ra t ive Committee which w a s  
A group of t h i s  
A f o u r t h  s t e p  which must be taken  involves  t h e  dec i s ion  i n  r ega rds  
t o  what degree an employee should be allowed t o  f i n d  h i s  own p o s i t i o n .  
To what ex ten t  w i l l  o rganiza t ion  goa l s  t a k e  precedence over  t h e  c a r e e r  
goa l s  of t h e  ind iv idua l  employees involved? I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  it i s  not  
p o s s i b l e  t o  specula te  wi th  any accuracy what, i f  any, d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  
would have been achieved i f  Gemini employees had been a b l e  t o  ba rga in  
f r e e l y  f o r  t h e i r  new p o s i t i o n s  r a t h e r  t han  having reassignments  con- 
t r o l l e d  t o  such a high degree by management. Perhaps t h o s e  r e spons ib l e  
f o r  t h e  dec is ions  i n  any f u t u r e  phase out  might wish t o  cons ider  con- 
t r o l l i n g  t h e  t ime and circumstances under which in te rv iewing  i s  allowed 
r a t h e r  t han  at tempting t o  c o n t r o l  t h e  types  of job  o f f e r s  t h a t  could be  
made and inves t iga t ed .  
F i n a l l y ,  once t h e s e  dec i s ions  have been made, t h e  ques t ion  of ade- 
qua te  and t imely  communications i s  introduced.  J u s t  how much should be 
t o l d  t o  t h e  a f fec ted  employees regard ing  what i s  o r  w i l l  be t ak ing  p l a c e ,  
and when t h i s  should be done are important ques t ions  t o  be considered.  
I n  t h e  case  o f  t h e  Gemini phase out management dec i s ions  i n  regards  t o  
t h e  secrecy aspec t  v i r t u a l l y  ignored t h e  ex i s t ence  of t h e  informal  com- 
munications network found i n  any organiza t ion .  By providing t h e  employ- 
ees  wi th  as much information as i s  p o s s i b l e  under t h e  e x i s t i n g  circum- 
s tances  it i s  not only poss ib l e  t o  minimize t h e  rumors emanating from 
t h i s  informal network, bu t  it may be p o s s i b l e  t o  u t i l i z e  t h e  system t o  
t h e  advantage of management. 
An important cons idera t ion  i n  a l l  t h e s e  dec i s ions  i s  t h e  t ime fac-  
t o r .  If prepara t ions  are begun soon enough t h e  machinery f o r  implement- 
ing  t h e  procedures can be  set  i n t o  motion as soon as it i s  needed. The 
ob jec t ive  of any phase down should be t o  have t h e  reassignments  completed 
as quick ly  as i s  p o s s i b l e  even though a c t u a l  t r a n s f e r  of  an i n d i v i d u a l  
may have t o  w a i t  f o r  t h e  complet ion.of  t h e  cu r ren t  t a s k  as a c t u a l l y  
happened i n  t h e  phase down of t h e  Gemini o f f i c e  i n  Washington. 
The s t e p s  which have been d iscussed  above a r e  gene ra l  enough SO 
t h a t  t hey  could be taken  w e l l  i n  advance of t h e  a c t u a l  phase out  of a 
program o f f i c e .  These t o g e t h e r  wi th  t h e  environmental  condi t ions  which 
e x i s t  a t  t h e  t ime a p a r t i c u l a r  program i s  completed and t h e  program of- 
f i c e  phase o u t ,  w i l l  provide u s  wi th  t h e  b a s i s  on which t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
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t h e  phase out  of t h e  Mercury P r o j e c t  Of f i ce  and t h e  Gemini Program O f -  
f i c e .  The f i r s t  l i s t i n g  inc ludes  t h e  people who were interviewed and 
t h e  da t e s  on which each w a s  consul ted.  The second l i s t  inc ludes  those  
who were f r equen t ly  consul ted  by t h e  au thor  during h e r  t h r e e  months a t  
t h e  Manned Spacecraf t  Center and t o  whom g r a t e f u l  acknowledgement i s  
hereby expressed. 
Formal Interviews 
1. Robert J .  Bai ley ,  Executive A s s i s t a n t ,  Apollo Spacecraf t  Program 
Of f i ce ,  February 1 5 ,  1967. 
2.  W i l l i a m  M. Bland, Former Deputy Manager, Mercury P r o j e c t  Of f i ce ;  
Chief ,  R e l i a b i l i t y ,  Qua l i ty ,  and T e s t  D iv i s ion ,  Apollo Spacecraf t  
Of f i ce ,  January 26, 1967. 
3. Anthony R. Canne t t i ,  Headquarters Personnel ,  Off ice  of Manned Space 
F l i g h t ,  NASA Headquarters,  Washington, March 3,  1967. 
4. Andrew Conversano, J r . ,  Chief ,  Executive S t a f f  Planning,  Of f i ce  o f  
Manned Space F l i g h t ,  NASA Headquarters,  Washington, March 3,  1967. 
5. Robert A. Dittman, Former Adminis t ra t ive A s s i s t a n t ,  Gemini Program 
Of f i ce ;  Chief ,  Program Control  Of f i ce ,  Adminis t ra t ive D i r e c t o r a t e ,  
January 23, 1967. 
6. Samuel H. Hubbard, Gemini Program Spec ia l  A s s i s t a n t ,  Off ice  of Manned 
Space F l i g h t ,  NASA Headquarters,  Washington, March 3, 1967. 
7. Kenneth S. Kleinknecht,  Former Manager, Mercury P r o j e c t  Of f i ce ;  For- 
m e r  Deputy Manager, Gemini Program Of f i ce ;  Deputy Manager, Apollo 
Spacecraf t  Program Of f i ce ,  January 26, 1967. 
8. Charles W. Mathews, Former Manager, Gemini Program Off ice ;  D i r e c t o r ,  
Saturn/Apollo Appl ica t ions  Program Of f i ce ,  Off ice  of Manned Space 
F l i g h t ,  NASA Headquarters ,  Washington, March 6 ,  1967. 
9. Andre Meyer, J r . ,  Former Senior  A s s i s t a n t ,  Gemini Program Office;  
Manager, Program Cont ro l ,  Advanced Spacecraf t  Technology Divis ion ,  
Engineering and Development D i r e c t o r a t e ,  February 7 ,  1967. 
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TO : Former Gemini Program Office Ehployees DATE: February 16, 1967 
FROM BF/ZhieI", Personnel Division 
SUBJECT: Questionnaires 
As you know, the Gemini Program Office has recently been phased out. 
Because the Center is program oriented, we will periodically have other 
programs phasing in and phasing out. Therefore, it is our desire to 
develop the best possible techniques for dealing with these program 
phasedowns. 
The purpose of the attached questionnaire is to furnish us with some 
insight into the personal aspects of the GPO phasedown. Please com- 
plete this questionnaire and please be candid. 
naire will be used only to assist us in evaluating the techniques which 
were used in order to make any necessary improvement in future program 
phasedowns. 
Your completed question- 
Please return the completed questionnaire to Code BP by February 27. 
Floyd D. Brandon 
Enclosure 
BP : FDBrandon :mc 2-16-67 
wo-la 








7 .  
8. 
G E M I N I  PROGRAM OFFICE PHASEDOWN 
[167 ques t ionnai res  d i s t r i b u t e d ;  101 r e tu rned  (60.5%)3 
Length of s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  Federa l  s e r v i c e :  
P o s i t i o n  and o rgan iza t ion  immediately p r i o r  t o  e n t r y  i n t o  GPO: 
GPO assignment and l eng th  of s e r v i c e  i n  GPO: 
Organization t o  which ass igned  from GPO and e f f e c t i v e  d a t e  of re- 
as s ignment : 
Were you aware t h a t  reassignment of o t h e r  personnel  had begun be fo re  
you were o f f i c i a l l y  n o t i f i e d  of your r e l e a s e  f o r  in te rv iew? 
If y e s ,  approximately how long before?  
97 responses ,  92.8% were aware, 7.2% were unaware 
a. If yes ,  what,  i f  any, ac t ion  d id  you t a k e  on your own behal f  
p r i o r  t o  t h e  t ime you were n o t i f i e d ?  
91 responses ,  answers ranged from Ira few weeks" t o  "about s i x  
months'' wi th  t h e  major po r t ion  c l e a r l y  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  2 t o  3 
months as s t a t e d  i n  t h e  paper .  
b. If yes ,  do you f e e l  t h i s  pe r iod  of unce r t a in ty  about your f u t u r e  
p o s i t i o n  adversely a f f e c t e d  your a b i l i t y  t o  devote your f u l l  at- 
t e n t i o n  t o  your Gemini r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ?  
91 responses;  65.9% s a i d  no e f f e c t ;  34.1% s a i d  some e f f e c t .  
Do you f e e l  you had a thorough knowledge of t h e  reassignment p o l i c i e s  
and procedures used? I f  no, why no t?  
96 responses;  51.0% s a i d  thorough knowledge, 12.5% s a i d  some knowledge, 
36.5% s a i d  no knowledge. 
Do you f e e l  you should have been b r i e f e d  sooner on t h e  GPO phasedown? 
98 responses ,  65.3% s a i d  no, 25.5% s a i d  y e s ,  4.1% s a i d  b r i e f e d  soon 
enough but  needed a more thorough one, and 5.1% s a i d  never b r i e f e d  
a t  a l l .  
Do you f e e l  you had been reass igned  t o  a p o s i t i o n  c o n s i s t e n t  wi th  your 
background and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and where your s k i l l s  can b e s t  be u t i -  
l i z e d ?  If no, p l ease  expla in .  
95 responses ,  76.9% said y e s ;  8.4% s a i d  yes  wi th  some r e s e r v a t i o n s ,  
14.7% s a i d  no. 
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16. 
d a r r a  g e  your own in te rv iews?  
91 responses ,  29.7% s a i d  yes,  9.9% s a i d  yes  i f  l i s t  of a v a i l a b l e  
p o s i t i o n s  had been provided, 48.3% s a i d  no, and 12.1% s a i d  they  
a c t u a l l y  arranged their own in te rv iews .  
Do you f e e l  you had a n  opportuni ty  t o  choose t h e  type  of work t o  
which you were assigned? 
97 responses ,  53.6% s a i d  yes,  15.5% said yes  wi th in  l i m i t s ,  and 
30.9% s a i d  no. 
I n  your opinion,  have most GPO personnel  been assigned t o  p o s i t i o n s  
where they can perform most e f f e c t i v e l y ?  
74 responses ,  60.8% s a i d  yes ,  25.7% s a i d  yes wi th  r e se rva t ions  about 
p a r t i c u l a r  people ,  and 13.7% said gene ra l ly  no. 
I f  no, p l ease  expla in .  
Would it have been b e t t e r  t o  keep t h e  "Gemini Program Off ice  team" 
toge the r  as a group for f u t u r e  p r o j e c t s ?  
reasons f o r  your answer. 
88 responses ,  61.4% s a i d  no, t h e  team should not have been kept 
t o g e t h e r ,  26.1% s a i d  yes ,  t h e  team should have been he ld  t o g e t h e r ,  
8.0% s a i d  t h e  team i s  s t i l l  p a r t i a l l y  t o g e t h e r ,  and 4.5% s a i d  no 
opinion. 
P lease  expla in  t h e  
How long do you es t imate  it w i l l  t a k e  t o  f u l l y  acquaint  your se l f  w i th  
your new work and organiza t ion?  
83 responses ,  30.1% s a i d  already familiar, 32.6 % s a i d  wifiin t h r e e  
months, 31.3% said t h r e e  t o  s i x  months, and 6.0% said longer  than  
s i x  months. 
Does your new p o s i t i o n  r equ i r e  any s p e c i a l  r e t r a i n i n g ?  
i s  t h i s  being conducted and f o r  what per iod  of t ime? 
93 responses ,  76.3% s a i d  no s p e c i a l  r e t r a i n i n g  needed, 17.2% said 
s p e c i a l  r e t r a i n i n g  was necessary and w a s  undertaken through s p e c i a l  
courses ,  and 6.5% said r e t r a i n i n g  was r equ i r ed  bu t  not made ava i l -  
ab l e .  
If y e s ,  how 
How does program o f f i c e  experience prepare  you f o r  work i n  o the r  MSC 
organiza t ions  ? 
Please  g ive  suggest ions fo r  improving t h e  procedures which were used 
and a d d i t i o n a l  comments you may have about t h e  phase out  of t h e  
Gemini Program Office.  
56 responses .  
